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A bstract
Conventional access control models, such as role-based access control, protect sensitive 
d ata  from unauthorized disclosure via direct accesses, however, they fail to  prevent 
unauthorized disclosure happening through indirect accesses. Indirect da ta  disclosure 
via inference channels occurs when sensitive information can be inferred from non­
sensitive data  and m etadata, which is also known as “the  inference problem” . This 
problem has drawn much attention from researcher in the database community due to 
its great compromise of d a ta  security. It has been studied under four settings accord­
ing to  where it occurs. They are statistical databases, multilevel secure databases, 
data  mining, and web-based applications.
This thesis investigates previous efforts dedicated to inference problems in multi­
level secure databases, and presents the latest findings of our research on this problem. 
Our contribution includes two methods. One is a dynamic control over this problem, 
which designs a set of accessing key distribution schemes to  remove inference after 
all inference channels in the  database has been identified. The other combines rough 
sets and entropies to form a com putational solution to  detect and remove inferences, 
which for the first tim e provides an integrated solution to  the inference problem. 
Comparison with previous work has also been done, and we have proved both  of 
them  are effective and easy to  implement.
Since the inference problem is described as a problem of detecting and removing 
inference channels, this thesis contains two main parts: inference detecting techniques 
and inference removing techniques. In both two aspects, some techniques are selec­
tively but extensively examined.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A cknow ledgem ents
I would like to express appreciation to  my thesis supervisor, Professor Ruizhong 
Wei, for leading me into this interesting research field and guiding me throughout 
my m aster’s studies. I would also like to  thank  the external examiner of my thesis, 
Professor Michael J. Jacobson a t University of Calgary, for his helpful comments. 
Finally, I would like to thank  my families for their love and support.
11
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table o f C ontents
A bstract i
Acknow ledgem ents ii
List of Figures v
List o f Tables vi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Inference Problem in S tatistical D a ta b a s e s ................................................  1
1.2 Inference Problem in Multilevel Secure D a ta b a s e s ..................................  2
1.3 Inference Problem and D ata  M in in g ............................................    4
1.4 Web-Based Inferences......................................................................................... 4
1.5 Structure of the T h e s is .....................................................................................  5
2 General C haracterizations o f Inferences 6
2.1 Goguen and Meseguer’s T h e o r y ....................................................................  7
2.2 Denning, Dorothy, and M orgenstern’s Theory .........................................  8
2.3 Categories of Inference C hannels ..................................................................... 9
3 D etection  of Inferences 10
3.1 D atabase Inference Engine Based on Semantic Relationship Graph . . 10
3.1.1 Graph Based Inference D e te c t io n .................................................... 10
3.1.2 Semantic Specificity ( S S ) .............................................   14
3.1.3 Rule Based Analysis ( R B A ) .............................................................. 16
3.1.4 Performance and R e m a rk s .........................................    17
3.2 The Use of Conceptual Structures to  Detect In fe ren ce ............................ 18
3.2.1 Semantic Nets and the Inference Problem  ................................... 19
3.2.2 Conceptual Graphs and the  Inference P ro b le m ............................  29
3.2.3 R e m a rk s ...............................     32
3.3 D ata Level Inference Detection in Database Systems  ........................  32
3.3.1 Overview of the Inference R u l e s ....................................................... 33
111
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TA B LE  OF C O N T E N T S  iv
3.3.2 Preliminaries and N o ta tio n .................    34
3.3.3 Inference R u l e s ............................    35
3.3.4 Inference with Union Queries ........................................................... 38
3.3.5 Performance and R e m a rk s .................................................................  39
3.4 The Application of Decision Trees to the Inference P ro b lem ................  40
3.4.1 Trade-off between Functionality and Security ...........................  40
3.4.2 Decision Tree A n a ly s is ...................................   43
3.4.3 R e m a rk s ...................................................................................................  46
3.5 A Scheme Using Rough Sets and Entropy to Handle the Inference
P r o b le m ................................................................................................................ 46
3.5.1 Outline of the S c h e m e ........................................................................  46
3.5.2 Making Decision R u l e s ........................................................................  47
3.5.3 Quantifying Inform ation in D a tab ases .............................................  51
3.5.4 R e m a rk s ...........................................................................    53
4 Removal o f Inferences 54
4.1 Dynamic Inference C o n tro l.............................................................................  54
4.1.1 Preliminaries ..........................................................    54
4.1.2 Dynamic Inference C o n tro l.................................................................  57
4.1.3 R e m a rk s ...................................................................................................  60
4.2 Accessing Key Distribution Schemes ......................................................... 61
4.2.1 Overview ................................................................................................  61
4.2.2 Single Key Set Schemes .....................................................................  62
4.2.3 M ultiple Key Set S c h e m e s .................................................................. 68
4.2.4 R e m a rk s .................................................................................................... 71
5 Conclusion and Future R esearch 72
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
List o f F igures
1.1 Indirect information access via in f e r e n c e .................................................  2
3.1 Example Semantic Relationship G r a p h ..................................................... 11
3.2 False In fe re n c e s ................................................................................................. 13
3.3 Semantic Relationship Graph as Instances of Semantic N e t ...............  15
3.4 Mission Target Example Semantic Relationship G raph ......................  17
3.5 Multilevel Semantic N e t s ................................................................................ 20
3.6 Gomplex Multilevel Semantic N e t ...............................................................  21
3.7 ISA, AKO Links .........................................................................................  22
3.8 Sample R u l e s ....................................................................................................  23
3.9 Application of Transfer R u l e .........................................................................  26
3.10 Representing Security G o n stra in ts ...............................................................  27
3.11 Security Gonstraint V io la t io n ...................................................................... 28
3.12 Multilevel Conceptual G ra p h .........................................................................  30
3.13 Negative S ta te m e n t ..........................................................................................  31
3.14 Complex Assertions  ........................................................  31
3.15 Universal S tatem ent ......................................................................................  32
3.16 The First Branching ......................................................................................  44
3.17 The First Branching with Partial D ecisions..............................................  45
3.18 Decision T r e e ....................................................................................................  45
4.1 Dynamic Inference Control  ...............    56
4.2 Example of inference c o n tro l ...................................    63
V
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
List o f Tables
3.1 Sample D a ta b a s e ..............................................................................................  35
3.2 High D atabase .................................................................................................  41
3.3 Low D atabase =  D o w n g rad e .......................................................................... 41
3.4 Base S e t ............................................................................................................... 41
3.5 Low Database =  Reduced D ow ngrade......................................................... 42
3.6 Reduced Base S e t ..............................................................................................  43
3.7 Original D a ta b a se ..............................................................................................  48
3.8 Modified D a t a b a s e ........................................................................................... 49
3.9 Core Values of Decision R u l e s ......................................................................  50
3.10 Reducts of Decision R u l e s .............................................................................  50
3.11 Further Modified D a ta b a s e ............................................................................   52
4.1 Comparison of System E nv ironm en t............................................................  67
4.2 Comparison of Cost and B e n e f it ...................................................................  67
4.3 Comparison w ith multiple key set schem e....................................................  70
VI
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
C hapter 1 
In troduction
Conventional access control models, such as role-based access control, protect sen­
sitive d a ta  from unauthorized disclosure via direct accesses, however, they fail to  
prevent indirect accesses. In Figure 1.1, under a traditional access control model, the 
direct access to sensitive data  is prohibited. However, the sensitive data  can still be 
revealed via inference by the user. We say an inference problem occurs when sensitive 
information can be inferred from non-sensitive da ta  and m etadata.
M etadata refers to  database constraints, or outside information, such as domain 
knowledge and query correlations. Depending on the level of accuracy by which 
the sensitive information is revealed, full disclosure or partial disclosure may occur. 
For example, suppose there is a database providing statistical da ta  which contains a 
sensitive a ttribu te  Salary. A common practice to  protect a ttribu te  Salary is to  block 
any direct queries over it. Unfortunately, this measure is not good enough. Since the 
com putation on it is available, users can still use m athem atical techniques to  infer a 
certain person’s salary.
The inference problem has been studied by researchers in the database community 
for a long time, for example, [25] [38] surveyed research efforts seeking to  formalize and 
resolve the problem. In summary, the inference problem can be classified into four 
categories depending on the setting where it occurs: statistical databases, multilevel 
secure(MLS) databases, da ta  mining, and web-based applications. Although thesis 
focuses on the inference problem in MLS databases, I would like to  give a brief 
description for each of them  for the sake of completeness.
1.1 Inference Problem  in S tatistical D atabases
The inference problem was first considered in statistical databases, the  above example 
is a  typical one of this case. The security requirement in statistical databases is to 
provide access to  statistics about groups of entities, such as mean, median, standard
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Figure 1.1; Indirect information access via inference
deviation, and so on, while protecting the  confidentiality of the individual entities. 
The threat is th a t an attacker may pose queries on aggregate statistics over a pe­
riod of time and perform arithm etic operations on the answers received, thus obtain 
confidential information about an individual entity. For example, suppose th a t an 
attacker wants to  find out the salary of A \ .  He can do this by asking for the average 
salaries of A \,A 1  and A3; of A2, A3, A4 and A5; and of A4 and A5. Alternatively, 
he can ask for the average salary of some set of individuals of which he knows th a t  
A l is the only member.
Inference control in statistical databases has been extensively studied in [15] [18] [43] 
[52]. A number of inference control mechanisms such as query size and query overlap, 
da ta  swapping, and multidimensional transform ation, were developed and their lim­
itations established. The main problem  is th a t simple inference control mechanisms 
are easily subverted. Mechanisms providing confidentiality with high assurance are 
often too complex and difficult to  implement, or not applicable in general purpose 
databases and thus are limited to  certain applications(e.g., U.S. Census Bureau d a ta ­
base).
1.2 Inference Problem  in M ultilevel Secure D ata­
bases
Researchers have started  considering the inference problem in multilevel secure(MLS) 
databases since early 1980’s. Most of previous works focused on defining the problem
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and providing frameworks to  address specific types of inferences. They provide an 
overview of different inference channels and present techniques to detect and remove 
them . They show th a t most of the inference channels in MLS databases are created 
by combining m etadata  (e.g., database constraints) with data  in order to  obtain  
information th a t has a higher security classification than  the original data.
As we mentioned above, the inference problem in MLS databases has been de­
scribed as a problem of detecting and removing inference channels. An inference 
channel is the minimum set of da ta  needed to  deduce the sensitive information. Cor­
respondingly, previous papers on the detection of inference channels can be classified 
into two categories. One is to  examine the functional dependencies among the  a t­
tribu tes in the database schema (see [3] [20] [29] [30] [32] [34] [35] [46] [72]). These papers 
propose graph-based m ethods to  detect illegal inferences. An inference channel is 
detected when there are two or more paths among the attributes, and the paths are 
labelled a t different classification levels. The other category is related to  partial or 
imprecise inferences (see [9] [10] [11] [12] [36] [37] [45] [74]). Partial inferences occur when 
an unauthorized user is able to  infer the  value or a set of values for a da ta  item  
w ith certain probability. Although the derived information is imprecise in nature, 
the granularity of the disclosed d a ta  item  may be enough to create a security leak. 
The other feature of these m ethods is th a t all of them  are trying to  find a balance 
between the security and the functionality of databases.
The other aspect of the inference problem is the removal of inference channels. 
Previously proposed techniques can be organized into three categories. The first ca t­
egory is to  remove inference channels during database design. This can be done by 
either modifying the database design or increasing the classification levels of some 
of the data  items (see [4] [27] [29] [46] [47] [62] [63] [67] [32]). However, these techniques 
often result in over-classification of data, and thus reduce the availability of data. For 
example, Hinke [29] [30] presents a semantic-graph based inference detection tool to  
represent semantic relationships and to  detect inference channels. M ethods belonging 
to  the second category seek to  eliminate inference channels during query time. If an 
inference channel is detected, the query is either refused or modified to avoid security 
violations (see [16] [42] [48] [48] [68] [69] [70] [79]). These methods allow inference detec­
tion at both the data  and schema level. W hile d a ta  level inference detection allows 
increased data  availability, it is com putationally expensive. For example, Denning 
[16] recommends an authorized view equivalence schema to remove any unauthorized 
da ta  from the answers to  select-only, select-project, and select-project-join queries. 
However, she does not address the inference problem in the presence of database con­
straints. The work of Thuraisingham  [69] presents a general and powerful logic-based 
framework. Dynamic models [13] [65] are the most recently proposed techniques on 
removing the inference channels. In [13] [65] [78], accessing keys distribution schemes 
are designed to  fulfill dynamic control over the inference problem. These m ethods 
consider both the query processing tim e and the  availability of data.
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1.3 Inference Problem  and D ata M ining
D ata mining can be defined as the process of mining for implicit, previously unknown, 
and potentially useful information from very large databases by efficient knowledge 
discovery techniques. While d a ta  mining opens up an area for extracting valuable 
data, it also introduces significant security concerns. The inference problem is one 
of them . Since da ta  mining is an a ttem pt to  answer the question “ W hat does all 
this da ta  mean?” , and inference is basically an attem pt to establish the relationships 
between d a ta  sets, we can say th a t d a ta  mining autom ates the inference problem. In 
addition, with the rapid increase of electronically available information, d a ta  m in­
ing represents an greater risk than  in conventionally centralized databases for th a t 
information originating from different sources can be analyzed.
Papers considering the inference problem in data  mining emerged during the  mid 
1990’s (see [24][39][51][54][64][73]). Security threats based on d a ta  mining can be 
addressed either in preprocessing phase or during run-time. For preprocessing, a set 
of mining tools are applied on the database to  check whether sensitive information 
can be disclosed from the learned patterns. For run-time, the inference controller 
evaluates the result to  a user’s request, and perm its or rejects the release of the result 
based on this evaluation. In either mode, da ta  mining abilities are reduced. Moreover, 
none of these approaches protect from inferences when the pattern  discovered in one 
database is applied on a different database, since it is unrealistic to  assume th a t all 
related database would enforce the same security policy.
Recently, several works[l][2][7][8] addressing privacy preserving da ta  mining have 
surfaced. Their main m otivation is to  allow data  accessible for mining purposes, 
while preserving the confidentiality of the data. Techniques such as d a ta  estim ation, 
perturbation and sample size restrictions are used to  remove any unwanted inferences. 
The main aim of this research is to  apply minimal modification to  the  original d a ta  
w ithout disturbing the data  mining results. In addition to  secure d a ta  mining, efficient 
methods of data sharing is im portant in distributed settings because of the  large size 
of the involved databases. Finally, a practical m ethod should be independent from 
any specific data  mining patterns due to  the diversity of them.
1.4 W eb-Based Inferences
W ith the further development of World W ide Web, new privacy problems surfaced. 
Almost a t the same time, works to  provide controlled accesses to  documents in ex­
tensible Makeup Language (XML) form at surfaced[5][23][40]. These models focus 
on defining access controls on XML documents, thus preventing privacy violations 
via direct da ta  accesses. While these mechanisms are necessary, none of them  pro­
vide technical solutions to  enforce privacy requirements in the presence of possible
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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inferences, or give assurance on the level of protection.
The development of technologies supporting the Semantic Web[6] , increases the 
risk of illegal da ta  accesses via inference channels. A utom ated analysis allows soft­
ware agents to  integrate large amounts of possibly distributed data. Such integration 
is impossible for hum ans because of the size of the d a ta  sources. The main pu r­
pose of Semantic Web research is to provide interoperation and intelligent query 
processing[19][21][22][28][55] . While some inferences[66] are considered from the per­
spective of enabling machine processing of the Web, there is no comprehensive security 
analysis available.
Existing inference control technologies are insufficient to  deal with this problem 
in the Web environment. Moreover, tracing user collaborations poses a challenge for 
security, where it m ight be desirable to  support anonymous access to  the web-based 
information resources.
1.5 Structure o f the Thesis
As previously mentioned, the inference problem is a problem of detecting and remov­
ing inference channels. The purpose of this thesis is not only to  provide a compre­
hensive view of the  inference problem in MLS databases, bu t to  present m ethods th a t 
assist DBAs in finding optim al solutions to  this problem in practice. Therefore in 
later chapters, previous works are summarized, and the findings of our research are 
presented as well. To this end, the remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. 
Chapter 2 introduces the early efforts in formalizing the inference problem. Chapter 
3 focuses on the detection of the inference problem, meanwhile corresponding removal 
techniques for some of them  are given. Chapter 4 discusses inference removal tech­
niques. In chapter 5, we give the conclusion of this thesis and pu t forward some future 
research topics.
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G eneral C haracterizations o f  
Inferences
Although it is not easy, some efforts have been dedicated in formalizing the inference 
problem ever since its emergence. As a case in point, consider the following two stories 
from [75]. The stories concern the US government’s a ttem pt to  keep the existence 
and the location of the M anhattan Project secret during World W ar II:
Finally I  learned that we were going to New Mexico, to a place not far from Santa  
Fe. Never having heard about New Mexico, I  went to the library and borrowed the 
“Federal W riters’ Project Guide to New Mexico”. A t the back o f the book, on the slip 
of paper on which borrowers signed their names, I  read the names o f Joan Hinton, 
David Frisch, Joseph McKibben, and all the other people who had been mysteriously 
disappearing to hush-hush war jobs without saying where. I  had uncovered their des­
tination in a simple and unexpected fashion. It is next to impossible to m aintain  
absolute secrecy and security in war time.
This reminds me of another story. Since I  knew Stebbins well, about a month after 
arriving at Los Alamos. I  wrote to him. I  did not say where I  was but I  mentioned  
that in January or February I  had seen the star Canopus on the horizon. Later it 
occurred to me that as an astronomer he could easily have deduced m y latitude since 
this star of the Southern skies is not visible above the 38th parallel.
There are several im portant things to  note about these stories. First of all, in 
figuring out the destination of his mysteriously vanishing colleagues, Ulam did not 
use standard logical deduction. Instead, he looked for the best explanation for the 
fact th a t they had all checked out a guidebook for the same place. Second, although 
Ulam was able to  deduce the destination of his friends from the  guidebook, he did 
not know enough to  look for the guidebook until he already knew some sensitive 
information: the location of the project he himself would be working on. If he had 
not known th a t information, he might have had to  look at every guidebook in the
6
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library to  find out the location of the M anhattan  Project. Third, Ulam also needed 
some relatively nonsensitive information to  make his deduction; namely, the fact 
th a t some of his colleagues had been leaving to  work on w hat were apparently secret 
government projects. Finally, it is not always possible to predict w hat information 
an individual will know th a t can be used to  deduce facts from other, apparently 
nonsensitive facts; this is the point of the story about Canopus and the 38th parallel.
2.1 G oguen and M eseguer’s T heory
Probably the earliest formal characterization of the inference problem  in databases 
is th a t of Goguen and Meseguer[27]. Consider a database in which each d a ta  item  is 
given an access class, and suppose th a t the  set of access classes is partially ordered. 
Define the relation —» as follows.
D efinition 2.1.1 Given data items x  and y, we say that x  y i f  it is possible to 
infer y  from  x.
The relation —> is reflexive and transitive.
D efinition 2.1.2 A set S  is said to be inferentially closed i f  whenever x is in S  and 
x  y holds, then y belongs to S  as well.
D efinition 2.1.3 For an access class L, let E{L)  denote the set consisting o f all 
possible responses that are classified at access class less than or equal to L. There is 
an inference channel i f  E{L)  is not inferentially closed.
Goguen and Meseguen do not set forth any one candidate for the relation —». 
They merely require th a t it be reflexive and transitive, and say th a t  it will probably 
be generated according to  some set of rules of inference, for example, first-order logic, 
statistical inference, and so on. However, they do denote th a t for most inference 
systems of interest, determining th a t  A  —y b (where A is a set of facts and 6 is a 
fact) is at best semidecidable, th a t is, there is an algorithm th a t will give the answer 
in a finite amount of tim e if A ^  6, otherwise may never halt.Com plexity-theoretic 
properties of inference relations in multilevel databases are considered further by 
Thuraisingham  in [71].
Goguen and Meseguer, besides not fixing on any inference system  or set of in­
ference systems, leave several other questions unexplored. For instance, they do not 
consider the effect on the inference problem of information th a t may exist outside the 
database. Nor do they attem pt to  include any measure of the difficulty of computing 
an inference.
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2.2 D enning, Dorothy, and M orgenstern’s T heory
As a refinement of Goguen and Meseguer’s theory, Denning, Dorothy and M orgenstern 
in [17] derive the inference relation from classical information theory. Given two 
d a ta  items x  and y, let H{y)  denote the  uncertainty of y, and let Hx{y)  denote 
the uncertainty of y given x  (where uncertainty is defined in the usual information- 
theoretic way). Then, the reduction in uncertainty of y  given x  is defined as follows:
IN F E R (T  ^  y) =
The value of I N F E R { x  y) is between 0 and 1. If the value is 0, then  it is 
impossible to  infer any information about y  from x.  If the value is between 0 and 1, 
y  becomes somewhat more likely given x. If the value is 1, then y  can be inferred 
given X .
The INFER relation can be used in the following way. Choose an e >  0 and define 
the sphere of influence of a set of da ta  to  be the set of all d a ta  items y  such th a t there 
exists an x  in the data  set such th a t I N F E R { x  —> y) >  e. A system is safe from 
inference if, for each security class G, the sphere of influence of all d a ta  items with 
security level less than  or equal to  C  does not contain any data  elements of a higher 
or incomparable class.
Note th a t unlike the inference relations defined in previous section, the sphere 
influence relation is nontransitive. For example, knowing the street on which some­
one lives may reduce our uncertainty about the person, knowing tha t an individual 
works on a project may reduce out uncertainty about the nature of the project, bu t 
knowing the name of a street inhabited by someone working on a project reduces our 
uncertainty about the project somewhat less.
This formulation is especially nice since it shows th a t inference is not an absolute 
problem, but a relative one. It gives us a way to quantify the bandwidth of the illegal 
information flow. On the other hand, it has serious drawbacks.
1. In most cases it is difficult, if not impossible, to  determine the values of H^,(y).
2. It does not take into account the com putational complexity th a t is required to  
draw the inference.
To illustrate the second point, the following example from cryptography is pre­
sented in [17]. W ith few exceptions, the  original tex t can be inferred from the  en­
crypted text by trying all possible keys (so H^iy)  =  1 in this case). However, it is 
hardly practical to  do so.
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2.3 Categories o f Inference Channels
A discussion of the kinds of inference functions th a t would be appropriate for de ter­
mining the security of a multilevel database is given by Garvey, Lunt and Stickel [26]. 
Three kinds of inference channels are summarized;
1. Deductive channels, in which high data  may be formally derived from low data .
2. Abductive channels, in which a deductive proof could be completed if certain  
low-level axioms were assumed.
3. Probabilistic channels, which occur when there is low d a ta  th a t can be used to  
decrease the uncertainty about the nature of high data, and it is likely th a t the 
low data  will be known by a low user.
Ulam’s second story, about the sighting of Ganopus, is an example of abductive 
reasoning. Ulam wrote his friend th a t he had seen Canopus on the horizon and then  
realized th a t, not only could the low-level fact, together with another low-level fact, 
be used to  deduce the  high-level fact, bu t th a t the  second low-level fact was likely to 
be known to  the low-level recipient of his letter.
Techniques and tools th a t make use of abductive reasoning and probabilistic rea­
soning provide a good way of characterizing cases in which high-level information can 
be derived using low-level information from bo th  inside and outside a database. G ar­
vey and his colleagues discuss how these techniques might be used to  make sure th a t  a 
database is free from inference channels. For each high-level fact in the database, one 
attem pts to discover w hat low-level facts could be used either to  derive the high-level 
fact or to make it more likely to  be derived. One also measures the likelihood th a t  
these low-level facts are known. They also point out th a t autom ated tools used for 
abductive proofs have features th a t measure the difficulty of a proof, and th a t such a 
feature can provide a guide to  the difficulty a low-level user would have in performing 
the inference.
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C hapter 3 
D etectio n  o f Inferences
In this chapter, we will introduce some representative techniques in detecting the in­
ference problem, meanwhile, some techniques to remove the problem are also briefly 
described. Section 3.1 and 3.2 discuss m ethods detecting inferences based on the 
functional dependencies among attribu tes. Section 3.3 introduces an inference de­
tecting m ethod th a t runs during query processing time. The last two sections are 
about partial inferences.
3.1 D atabase Inference Engine B ased on Sem antic  
R elationship  Graph
In this section we are going to  introduce an inference detection approach based on 
a graph based description of data, bo th  database resident da ta  and d a ta  commonly 
known in the application area. It shows how inference is detected basing on finding 
paths in w hat is term ed a semantic relationship graph. It also suggests two measures 
to  conquer the m ajor challenge of this approach, the elimination of false inference.
3.1.1 G raph B ased  Inference D etec tio n
In [30], Hinke presents an approach for a graph based m ethod of inference detection. 
This approach uses a graphical means to  describe the relationship of data. The graph 
is called the semantic relationship graph. It can be viewed as a variant of the entity 
relationship (E-R) graph, modified such th a t no distinction is made between entity 
sets and attribu tes of entity sets. The graph consists only of entity sets and links 
between entity sets which indicate binary relationships between entity sets.
An entity is some distinguishable thing. In this view, an entity could be something 
physical, such as a car, or some a ttribu te  of a car, such as its color. A set of such 
entities is called an entity set. A relationship between two entity sets exists if an
10
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Figure 3.1: Example Semantic Relationship G raph
entity in one entity  set is related to  an entity in another entity  set. For example, 
consider the entity sets “Pro ject” and “Company” . Each project is supported by one 
or more companies th a t is performing the work on the project. This means th a t there 
is a  relationship between elements of the project entity set and the company entity 
set, and hence a relationship between the “Project” and “Company” . In this case, 
since multiple companies can support a single project, the project-company relation 
is said to have a fan-out of n. A relationship between each project entity set and the 
manager entity set could have a fan-out of ju st 1, if each project has only a single 
manager.
The semantic relationship graph is a directed graph, hence the relationship be­
tween entity set X  and entity set Y  consists of two links - one from A  to F  and the 
other from Y  to X .  Each link has a distinct fan-out n, n  >  1. If both links have a 
fan-out th a t is greater than  one, this is w hat is considered an n  : n  relationship in 
database theory.
Figure 3.1 shows portions of a semantic relationship graph for an R&D project 
application area. Consider the situation in which the companies th a t support a sen­
sitive project are themselves sensitive. Note th a t  in Figure 3.1 the Project-Company 
relationship is shown with a dotted  line, indicating th a t th is is sensitive information 
and not generally available. To discover whether the available d a ta  permits this rela­
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tionship to  be inferred, we search the semantic relationship graph for a second path . 
One such p a th  is Project-M eeting-Person-Company. This path  connotes the case in 
which a person from company XYZ attends a meeting for project X-1. The fact th a t 
this person works for company XYZ can be used to  make the inference th a t company 
XYZ is supporting project X-1.
Fortunately, the path  M eeting-Person is also sensitive, thus the path  Project- 
M eeting-Person-Company is not generally available. However, there exists another 
path  M eeting-Contact-Person. A contact is the name of a person who schedules a 
room for a particular meeting. The contact also represents the escort for a visitor to  
an R&D facility. Using contact, we now have a second path  (an inference path) from 
Project to  Company, Project-M eeting-Contact-Person-Company.
This second path  involves two inference rules. The first inference rule is th a t if a 
meeting and a person share a contact, then the p rson is attending the  meeting. The 
second inference rule is th a t if a person working for a company attends a meeting for 
a project, then  the company is supporting the project. Together, bo th  of these s 
perm it us to  infer th a t a particular company is supporting a particular project.
Note th a t while inference rules can be sta ted  from the graph, they were not used 
to  discover the inference path . The inference pa th  was discovered by attem pting to  
find a second path  between project and company, since the direct pa th  was effectively 
closed due to the fact th a t it is sensitive and thus protected.
W hile many second paths may exist, it suffices to  find just one to perform  an 
inference. If this pa th  is closed, then  the technique can search for any other second 
paths. Ultimately, all such second paths must be eliminated to eliminate the inference 
possibilities from the database.
The graph based approach has all the rules th a t it needs to  find all inferences. 
The price for the completeness and yet simplicity is th a t the inference channels it 
finds also includes numerous false inference. Examples of false inference channels 
are shown in Figure 3.2. Consider the path  th a t runs from Project to Company, 
through the banks-with link. Under the pa th  finding rule, the objective is to  find 
an alternative path  between Project and Company. T h a t path  consisting of Project- 
M eeting-Contact-Person-Company(for which the person works) would be viewed as a 
legitim ate inference path . However the path  consisting of Project-M eeting-Contact- 
Person-Com pany(at which the person Banks), would not be considered a legitim ate 
inference path. It is what we are calling a false inference. The figure also illustrate 
the false inference arising from the case where a Person(whose contact is C ontact 1) 
is actually attending meeting A (with meeting Contact 2). B ut the inference rules 
we have been using would infer th a t the person is attending Meeting B. This would 
also be a false inference.
While it may not be possible to  eliminate all false inferences, the strategy under 
the graph based approach must sift out as many false inferences as possible.
This approach perm its one to identify what constitutes false inferences. Moreover,
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Figure 3.2; False Inferences
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
C H A P T E R  3. D E TE C T IO N  OF INFERENCES  14
an inference engine constructed above this approach perm its the inference engine to 
assist in knowledge engineering. One can, for example, begin w ith an inference engine 
consisting of just the semantic relationship graph for an application area. As inference 
paths are detected, they can be reviewed by the users and application domain experts 
to  assess whether they constitute legitimate inference paths. If so, then there is 
no problem. If, however, they are judged to  constitute false inference paths, then  
additional false inference detection rules can be added to  the rule base to  perm it the 
inference engine to  sift these false inference paths out of any future inference detection 
runs.
W ith this approach, inference paths are never missed, bu t as the  inference engine 
is used, the intelligence of the inference controller can be enhanced to  perm it it to  be 
more expert a t differentiating between false inference paths and legitimate inference 
paths.
The problem then is to reduce the number of false inference paths. There are two 
approaches can be used: semantic specificity (SS) and rule based analysis (RBA), 
which will be described in turn.
3 .1 .2  Sem antic S p ecific ity  (SS)
An example of how semantic specificity can reduce the number of false inference paths 
can be seen in the false inference example involving Project-M eeting-Contact-Person- 
Company(with which one banks) as an inference path  to  infer the Company associated 
with a particular classified project. This false inference arises because the semantic 
relationship graph has been sta ted  in term s of the semantic entity Company, which 
includes a Defense Contractor type company supporting a project and a Banking 
type company providing banking services for a Person. Since the  semantic relationship 
graph describes both  of them  as Companies, the relationship Pro  j ect-Company, which 
is sensitive, can be inferred by finding the two paths from P ro ject to  Company (for 
which a Person works) and Company(with which a Person banks). One of them  is a 
legitimate inference path  and the  other is a false inference path.
If Pro j ect-Company were presented as Project-Defense.Company, and the Person- 
Company(for which a person works) as Person-Defense.Company and Person-Banking 
-Company for the Person-Bank relationship, then  the path  Project-M eeting-Contact- 
Person-Banking-Company would not be found as an alternate pa th  for Project- 
Defense_Company.
Of course, the price paid is th a t the Person-Company(for which the person works) 
relation is now expanded from a single node relationship between two nodes, to  multi­
ple Person-Company relationships, one for each Person-Company combination. Thus 
one would have Person-Insurance.Company, Person-RetaiLCompany, Person-Factory, 
etc. This can clearly get out of hand very rapidly. The solution to  this is to  recognize 
th a t the semantic relationship graph should exist within the  context of a semantic
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Figure 3.3; Semantic Relationship Graph as Instances of Semantic Net
net consisting of ISA, part-of, and instance hierarchies. The semantic net describes 
semantics of each entity th a t is part of the semantic relationship graph. Note th a t the 
semantic relationship graph represents how one set of entities is related to  another, 
while a semantic net perm its each semantic relationship graph node to be strongly 
typed by relating it to a node in the semantic net through the instance-of relationship. 
Figure 3.3 shows the semantic relationship graph for the project-company example 
as instances of a semantic net.
A node within the semantic net is called a Semantic-Designator node, since it 
designates the semantics of lower level nodes - those nodes which inherit its prop­
erties. Since a Semantic-Designator-node may be a superior type of some lower 
level Semantic-Designator-nodes, we talk  of a Semantic-Designator-node designat­
ing a type set consisting of the Semantic-Designator-nodes and all instance nodes 
which are subtypes of the particular Semantic-Designator-node. Thus, in figure 3.3, 
Company designates the  type set Company consisting of Defense_Companies and 
Banking.Companies, and all the instances of them.
Paths within the semantic relationship graph are created by piecing together bi­
nary relationships, such as Project-M eeting with other joinable binary relationships
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such as M eeting-Contact. Joinable binary relationships are those binary relationships 
which have nodes th a t are semantically equivalent and hence joinable.
Two semantic relationship graph nodes are joinable if their type sets intersect. 
The composite node takes on the type set of the intersection of the type sets of the 
components. Hence, this is similar to  multiple inheritance, bu t only the common 
elements are inherited. If, for example, the joining of three nodes yields an em pty 
set, then pairwise joins will be performed, with the result th a t three composite nodes 
could result (e.g. 1 intersect 3, 1 intersect 3, 2 intersect 3).
The strategy is to  initially type a semantic relationship node as high in the sem an­
tic net as possible, so th a t its type set is as large as possible, yielding the  m aximum  
number of possible paths. As experience is gained with a particular semantic rela­
tionship graph, false inference paths may arise. One m ethod is to  constrain the type 
of certain semantic relationship graph nodes to  eliminate these false paths. For exam ­
ple, the Company in the Com pany-Project binary relation could initially be specified 
as of type Company, which includes Defense.Contractor and Bank. W hen the false 
inference from the join of Company of Project with Bank of Person arises, one can 
re-specify the Company of Project to  be of type Defense_Contractor. Now the type 
set of Defense_Contractor in Figure 3.3 includes only Defense_Contractor and its in­
stances. One also needs to re-specify the Company for which a person works as of 
type Defense_Contractor and the Company with which a Person banks as of type 
Bank, to eliminate the false inference.
3.1 .3  R u le  B ased  A n alysis (R B A )
Under the rule based analysis (RBA) m ethod, the domain expert writes rules th a t  
are designed to  detect paths th a t constitute false inferences and eliminate them  from 
those returned to  the user.
Figure 3.4 illustrates an example of a semantic relationship graph th a t is amenable 
to  RBA. The senario is th a t Missions have Countries th a t they target. For classified 
missions, the targets are assumed to  be classified. However, Missions are staffed by 
Person, and each Person speaks one or more Languages. These Languages are used 
in one or more Countries. The path  to infer the Country which a Mission targets is 
thus Mission-Person-Language-Country.
While this semantic relationship graph will catch all of the legitimate inferences 
th a t can be made from this information, it will also generate numerous false inferences. 
For example, if the missions are staffed by personnel from the United States, then  
presumably they all speak English. Since English is spoken in the U.S.A., Canada, 
The United Kingdom, Australia, as well as various other countries, all missions will 
show each of these countries as potential destinations as well as the countries associ­
ated with the other languages spoken by mission personnel. This example shows th a t 
those false inferences can not be removed by the SS discussed previously, however.
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Figure 3.4: Mission Target Example Semantic Relationship Graph
many can be eliminated through RBA.
Consider some of the rules can be applied to  this example to  eliminate false in­
ference paths. The first rule states th a t th is inference path  only applies to  cases 
involving languages which are very good country designators. For example, English 
and Spanish are poor country designators since they are the native language in too 
many countries of the world. B ut Persian is a good country indicator since it is 
spoken primarily in Iran. So the rule base would be enhanced with rules indicating 
which countries are good country indicators. One may also want to  add a rule th a t 
says 30% of the personnel assigned to  a mission must speak the same language before 
th is inference path  is considered. The addition of this rule should be quite effective 
in trimm ing false inferences from the paths. The paths remaining should have a high 
potential for indicating targets for a mission.
3 .1 .4  P erform ance and  R em arks
P ath  finding in a graph is 0(77^), where N  is the number of entity sets. Since for N  
entity sets, there are at most N'^ possible binary relationships among entities, th a t 
says checking all binary relations for second paths connecting them  is 0{N^ ) .  W hen 
a path  is found, appropriate action must be taken to  remove some piece of d a ta  in 
the path  so th a t the path  is broken and this particular second path  is removed. The 
algorithm then needs to  be run again to  see if any second paths still remain. Assuming 
one node is eliminated each tim e th a t the algorithm  is run for a given pair of entities, 
the algorithm will have to  be run at most N  — 2 times, making the to ta l algorithm  
for a single pair of entities 0{ N^ ) ,  and for all entities 0{N^) .
It is easy to  see th a t when a  legitim ate inference path  is identified (in other words, 
an inference channel is identified), a t least one object in it should be unavailable to
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the generic users in order to  protect the classified information. One common practice 
is to  raise the objects’ classification level so th a t the generic users cannot access them  
w ithout extra authorization.
3.2 The U se o f C onceptual Structures to  D etect  
Inference
In last section, Hinke’s work, which is based on the use of graphs for representing the 
applications and detects inferences by traversing alternate paths between two nodes in 
the graph, is discussed. W hile th is technique enables simple inference to  be detected 
via transitive property, it does not enable the detection of more complex inferences.
A m ethod using conceptual structures to  handle the inference problem is pre­
sented in [72] by Thuraisingham. Conceptual structures have many applications in 
artificial intelligence systems and natural-language processing. They have been used 
extensively for representing and reasoning about real-world knowledge. Multilevel 
conceptual structures are developed to  represent multilevel applications and the rea­
soning strategies for them  are used to  detect security violations via inference during 
database design.
From Thuraisingham ’s point of view, to  successfully handle inferences, it is not 
only im portant to be able to  present the  application semantics, b u t it is also essential 
th a t appropriate reasoning strategies be applied. Therefore conceptual structures, 
which are not only powerful representation schemes, but have a complete set of rea­
soning strategies, are investigated. The main focus is on the use of semantic nets. This 
is because semantic nets have been used extensively for a variety of d a ta  modelling, 
artificial intelligence, and natural language processing applications. However, to  deal 
with a multilevel environment, the concept of multilevel semantic nets is developed 
and it is showed how multilevel information can be captured by such a representation. 
Then the complete set of reasoning strategies are used to detect security violations 
via inference.
While semantic nets are powerful for representing and reasoning about a variety 
of applications, it has been shown th a t they do not have the capabilities of first- 
order logic. As a result, several extensions to  semantic nets have been proposed. 
One particular extension which is theoretically complete is the conceptual graph of 
Sowa [61], which will be briefly investigated later in this section. In particular, issues 
on developing multilevel conceptual graphs, and how reasoning techniques such as 
restriction, joining and simplifying could be applied to  handle the  inference problem 
are discussed .
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3.2.1 Sem antic N e ts  and th e  Inference P rob lem
1. Multilevel semantic nets
A multilevel semantic net is a semantic net with nodes and links classified a t 
different security level. Figure 3.5 shows some example multilevel semantic nets. 
We assume th a t there are only two security levels, Unclassified and Security. 
Note th a t the darkened shapes and lines are assumed to  be Secret.
Consider figure 3.5a. It states th a t all ships carry some weapons. In figure 
3.5a, both the node and the link are Unclassified. T ha t is, the  fact th a t ships 
carry weapons can be seen by all. In figure 3.56, the concepts SHIPS and 
W EAPONS can be seen by all, while the fact th a t ships carry weapons cannot 
be seen by Unclassified users since the link is classified Secret. In figure 3.5c, 
the Unclassified users know th a t something carries weapons, bu t they do not 
know th a t ships carry weapons. In figure 3.3d, the Unclassified users know th a t 
ships carry something, bu t they do not know what is carried by the  ships. In 
figure 3.5e, the Unclassified users know th a t something is carried by something 
else, bu t they do not know anything about ships and weapons. In figure 3 .5 /, 
Unclassified users know only about ships. In figure 3.5g, Unclassified users know 
only about weapons. In figure 3.56, nothing is visible to  the Unclassified users.
It needs to  be determined whether all the links described in figure 3.5 should 
be perm itted. For example, it may make sense to  classify a link at a level which 
dominates the levels of the nodes associated with the link. T h a t is, the level of 
the CARRY relationship must dom inate the levels of SHIPS and W EAPONS.
Figure 3.6 shows a more elaborate multilevel semantic net. The Unclassified 
interpretation of it is as follows: CHAMPION carries passengers. Its captain  is 
Smith, who has 20 years’ experience. The ship is located in the M editerranean 
Sea on 16 June 1990. Its destination is Greece. The Secret in terpretation is: 
CHAMPION carries SPARK which is an explosive. Its captain is Smith, who 
has battle  m anagement experience. The ship is located in the M editerranean 
Sea on 16 June 1990. Its destination is Libya.
We can see th a t certain information is polyinstantiated. Note th a t polyinstan­
tiation occurs when users at different security levels have different views of the 
same “thing” in the real world. By “thing” we mean concept, entity, event, or 
any relationship. Cover stories result in polyinstantiation. Figure 3.6 illustrates 
how cover stories may be represented.
In addition, a semantic net also has two standard links: ISA links and AKO 
links (See Figure 3.7). An ISA link is used to  specify th a t a particular individual 
belongs to  a particular group. Figure 3.7a shows an ISA link where CHAM PION 
is defined to be a particular shio. An AKO link defines a subset of a collection
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Figure 3.5; Multilevel Semantic Nets
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Figure 3.6: Complex Multilevel Semantic Net
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CHAMPION ISA SHIP
0 .7 a l
AKOSHIP WATER
VEHICLE
Figure 3.7: ISA, AKO Links
of individuals. Figure 3.76 defines the collection of ships to  be a subset of a 
collection of water vehicles. Note th a t the AKO relationship is assigned to  be 
Secret.
It does not make sense to  classify CHAMPION at the Secret level and SHIP at 
the Unclassified level. This is because CHAMPION is an instantiation of SHIP. 
By classifying SHIP a t the Secret level we are implicitly assuming th a t  any ship 
m ust be classified a t least a t the Secret level. It should also be noted th a t it does 
not make sense to  classify SHIP at the Unclassified level and W ATER VEHICLE 
a t the Secret level. This is because classifying SHIP a t the Unclassified level 
implicitly assumes th a t a ship should be classified a t least a t the Unclassified 
level. Classifying WATER VEHICLE a t the Secret level implicitly assumes th a t 
any water vehicle (including a ship) should be classified a t least a t the Secret 
level. This results in a conflict. Therefore, we enforce the following rules for 
consistency:
• Rule Al:  If X ISA Y, then  Level(X)> Level(Y).
•  Rule A2: If X AKO Y, then LevIe(X)>LeveI(Y).
2. Reasoning with multilevel semantic nets
Most real-world applications deal with very large quantities of information. 
Therefore, capturing all of the information in a semantic net would make the 
net extremely complex. W hat we need is a minimal semantic net with a pow­
erful set of reasoning strategies so th a t other information can be deduced. The 
information th a t is deduced is implicit information. For a multilevel application 
it should be ensured th a t  the level of implicit information th a t can be deduced 
by a user a t level L  should be dom inated by L.
Some rules for deducing implicit information are the following:
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Figure 3.8: Sample Rules
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•  Rule A3: If X AKO Y and Y AKO Z then X AKO Z. The level of the 
AKO link from X to Z is the least upper bound of the levels of AKO links 
from X to Y and Y to  Z.
Figure 3.8a illustrates an example. The semantic net has SHIP AKO 
WATER-VEHICLE and W ATER-VEHICLE AKO VEHICLE, and the  
AKO link from SHIP to  W ATER-VEHICLE is Secret. Then at the Se­
cret level, one can conclude th a t SHIP AKO VEHICLE.
•  Rule A4: If X AKO Y and Y has relationship R with Z, then X has 
relationship R  with Z. The level of the relationship R  th a t X has w ith 
Z is the least bound of the  level of the AKO link from X to Y and the 
relationship R  from Y to Z.
Figure 3.8b illustrates an example. The semantic net has SHIP AKO 
W ATER-VEHICLE and WATER-VEHICLE has captain PERSON. Then 
SHIP has captain PERSON.
•  Rule A5: If X ISA Y and Y AKO Z, then X ISA Z. The level of the ISA 
link from X to  Z is the least upper bound of the levels of the AKO link 
from Y to Z and the ISA link from X to  Y.
Figure 3.8c illustrates an example. CHAMPION ISA SHIP. This link is 
Secret. SHIP AKO W ATER-VEHICLE. Therefore, there is a Secret ISA 
link from CHAMPION to  WATER-VEHICLE.
•  Rule A 6 : If X ISA Y and Y has a  relationship R with Z, then X has 
relationship R  with Z. The level of the relationship R  th a t  X has w ith Z 
is the least upper bound of the levels of the ISA link from X to Y and the 
relationship R  from Y to  Z.
Figure 3.8d illustrates an example. The semantic net has CHAM PION ISA 
SHIP. SHIP has captain PERSON. Therefore, CHAM PION has captain  
PERSON.
• Rule A7: If X ISA Y and Z has relationship R  with X, then Z has rela­
tionship R  with Y. The level of the relationship R  th a t Z has with Y  is 
the least upper bound of the levels of the ISA link from X to Y and the 
relationship R  from Z to  X.
Figure 3.8e illustrates an example. The semantic net has Libya ISA COUN­
TRY. The ship CHAM PION’S destination is Libya. Therefore, the desti­
nation of CHAM PION is a country.
Conditional statem ents are of the form: A if B1 and B2 and .. .B n where B l, 
B2, . . . ,  Bn are the antecedents and A is the consequent.
Consider the following conditional statem ent: CHAM PION’S destination is
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Libya, if it is located in the M editerranean, and it carries SPARK, which is 
an explosive.
The conditional statem ent is represented by the auxiliary net shown in figure 
3.9a. T ha t is, the conditions are represented by dotted lines, and the conclusion 
is represented by solid lines. The transfer rule is applied in order to  process 
conditional statem ents. The following is the transfer rule;
• If all the dotted lines in the auxiliary net are shown as solid lines in a 
main multilevel semantic net, and the level of each solid line of the m ain 
net dom inated the level of the corresponding dotted  line in the auxiliary 
net, then the solid line in the auxiliary net is drawn as a solid line in the 
main net. The security level of the line drawn is the least upper bound 
of the levels of all the lines in the auxiliary net and the levels of all the 
corresponding solid lines already in the main net.
Figure 3.96 shows th a t the dotted  lines in the auxiliary net occur as solid lines 
in the multilevel semantic net. Figure 3.9c shows th a t  the solid line in the 
auxiliary net is added to  the multilevel semantic net a t the  appropriate security 
level.
3. Enforcing security constraints
Security constraints are rules which assign security levels to  the data. We repre­
sent security constraints by “constraint nets” (See Figure 3.10). A constraint net 
is a semantic net or an auxiliary semantic net which specifies only constraints. 
However, while semantic nets are used in general to  represent application infor­
mation, constraint semantic nets are used to  represent th e  security constraints 
so th a t any security violations in the application can be detected. Similarly, 
while auxiliary semantic nets are used to  derive implicit information, security 
constraints which are represented as auxiliary semantic nets are used to  de­
tect security violations. Therefore, we differentiate between ordinary auxiliary 
nets and constraint auxiliary nets. Figure 3.10a classifies the fact th a t CHAM­
PION carries something at the Secret level. Figure 3.106 shows a constraint 
which classifies the destination country of CHAMPION at the Secret level, if 
CHAMPION is located in the M editerranean and it carries SPARK.
Security violations occur (either directly or indirectly) if the constraint net con­
trad icts the multilevel semantic net which represents the application (either 
directly or indirectly). For example, the semantic net of Figure 3.11a violates 
both  constraints of Figure 3.10 directly. Since in Figure 3.11a, the fact th a t 
CHAMPION carries something is not Secret, which violates the constraint of 
Figure 3.10a. Also in Figure 3.11a, it is unclassified th a t CHAMPION is located
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Figure 3.9; Application of Transfer Rule
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Figure 3.10; Representing Security Constraints
in the M editerranean and carries SPARK. This directly violates the constraint 
of Figure 3.106. Constraints can be violated indirectly when the implicit infor­
m ation th a t can be inferred contradicts the security constraints. Figure 3.116 
shows how the security constraint of Figure 3.106 is violated indirectly. Here, 
CHAMPION carries SPARK and it is located in the M editerranean. Its desti­
nation country Libya is Unclassified. Since Libya is a country, by rule A7, the  
destination Libya of CHAMPION m ust be Secret. Therefore, the constraint of 
Figure 3.106 is violated indirectly.
4. Universal and existential conditionals
Constraint nets can also be used to  represent universal and existential condi­
tionals. There are two rules for constraint nets for universal and existential 
conditionals.
• Rule A9: Let A and B be subnets of two multilevel semantic nets. Note 
th a t a subnet is any subnet (nodes and links) of a semantic net. Subnets 
are also called vectors. A matches B if the following are satisfied:
(a) The links are labelled the same and have the same security levels.
(b) If a node in A is labelled w ith a constant, then the corresponding node 
in B is labelled with the same term , and the two nodes have the same
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Figure 3.11; Security Constraint Violation
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security levels.
(c) If two nodes in A are labelled w ith the same variable, then the corre­
sponding two nodes in B are labelled with the same constant. Further, 
the security levels of the corresponding nodes in the  two nets are the 
same.
•  Rule AlO: If a vector A matches with vector B, then for any variable x  in 
A, the corresponding node in B which matches with x  is called the binding 
of X .
3.2 .2  C on ceptu al G raphs and th e  Inference P rob lem
It can be seen th a t semantic nets are very useful for representing a multilevel ap­
plication and applying reasoning rules. However, they do not have the full power 
of first-order logic. Therefore, the conceptual graph, which has the full power of 
first-order logic, is introduced to  handle the inference problem.
A conceptual graph is a graph-based notation developed by Sowa[61] for represent­
ing and reasoning about knowledge. It evolved from other graph-based representation 
schemes, such as semantic nets. The basic constructs of conceptual graphs are the 
notions of concepts and relationships between concepts. A concept could be any en­
tity, action, or event. Concepts are represented as nodes and relationships as links. 
Each concept is an instantiation of a concept type. The concept types are ordered by 
the relation “< ” . For example, the concept types PERSON and MAN are ordered by 
M AN<PERSON. This means th a t every man is also a person. An instantiation of the 
type MAN is “John” . The relationships are also instantiations of RELATIONSHIP 
types. For example, if AGENT is a relationship type, it can be instantiated as John 
is the agent of drinking. This means th a t John is drinking.
1. Representational issues
A multilevel conceptual graph is a conceptual graph with security levels assigned 
to  concept types, concepts, relationship types and relationships. We enforce the 
following rules for consistency.
• Rule B l:  If X is an instantiation of concept type C, then Level(X)> 
Level(C).
• Rule B2: If Y is an instantiation of a relationship type R, then Level(Y)> 
Level (R).
• Rule B3: If C l and C2 are concept types and if C l< C 2 , the Level(C l)>  
Level(C2).
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Figure 3.12; Multilevel Conceptual Graph
Figure 3.12, 3.13, 3.14, 3.15 show how the conceptual graphs represent appli­
cations. Figure 3.12 shows how to  present different information at the Secret 
level and the Unclassified level. Figure 3.13 shows the negative information 
“It is not the case th a t there is a passenger ship FLORIDA which is going 
to  Greece” . Figure 3.14 shows the use of PROPO SITIO N type, representing 
the assertion “Enemy is going to  attack on 6 /16/90” . Figure 3.15 expresses a 
universal statem ent “Every ship is managed by a captain” .
2. Reasoning strategies
Several reasoning strategies have been proposed for conceptual graphs. Three 
deduction rules are:
•  Restriction: This rule takes a graph and replaces any of its concept nodes 
by a subtype concept node or by a special instance of the concept. For 
example, the concept type PERSON may be restricted to  MAN or an 
instance such as John.
•  Joining: This rule takes two graphs with a common concept (or concept 
type) and joins them  over this concept.
•  Simplifying: This rule removes duplicate relationships between two con­
cepts (or concept types) which could possibly arise after a join operation.
The following security properties should be enforced whenever a deduction rule 
is applied:
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Figure 3.14: Complex Assertions
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Figure 3.15: Universal Statement
•  Let C l be a conceptual graph and C2 be the result of applying the restric­
tion rule to  C l. Any security level of the restricted concept (or concept 
type) in C2 must dom inate the level of the original concept in C l.
• Let C l and C2 be conceptual graphs which are joined to  form C3. Any 
concept, concept type, or relationship in C3 must have the security level 
of the corresponding concept, concept type, or relationship in C l or C2.
•  Let C l be a conceptual graph simplified to C2. Let R1 and R2 be identical 
relationships between the same two concepts in C l. The security level of 
this relationship in the simplified graph C2 is the greater lower bound of 
the levels of R1 and R2.
3.2 .3  R em arks
Comparing with the m ethod discussed in last section, this m ethod is nicer because 
it develops multilevel conceptual structures to  capture the semantics of multilevel 
applications. In addition, it has a set of reasoning strategies applied to  detect security 
violation. The SSO(System Security Officer) could use these techniques to  m anually 
analyze the multilevel application and detect possible security violations.
3.3 D ata Level Inference D etection  in D atabase  
System s
In last two sections (Section 3.1 and 3.2), we introduced techniques employing func­
tional dependencies in database schema to detect inferences. It has been noticed th a t  
analyzing the data  stored in the database also help to detect more inferences. In [79], 
an inference detection technique based on d a ta  level is presented.
In this method, live inference rules used to  infer da ta  are identified: ‘subsum e’, 
'unique characteristic’, ‘overlapping’, ‘complementary’ and ‘functional dependency’. 
The goal is to detect if a user can indirectly access da ta  using two or more queries. In
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particular, the system determines if the user can infer the return  tuples from different 
queries corresponding to  the same tuple in the database.
3.3 .1  O verview  o f th e  In ference R u les
The intuition behind the five inference rules are as follows. The result of each user 
query is a set of return  tuples. The user cannot identify each return  tuple unless the 
prim ary key of the tuple is also returned. However, a certain group of a ttribu te  values 
of a tuple may uniquely identify the  tuple. The unique identification rule handles this 
situation. Another way to identify a retu rn  tuple is to  compare it w ith other retu rn  
tuples th a t have already been identified.
There are two possible relationships between two sets of return  tuples. One possi­
bility is th a t for each return  tuple H of a query, there is a return  tuple fg of the other 
query, such th a t H and correspond to the same tuple in the database. The subsume 
inference rule handles this case. Another possibility is th a t only some return  tuples of 
a query correspond to  some return  tuples of another query. The overlapping inference 
rule identifies the corresponding return  tuple th a t are common to  both queries. The 
complementary inference rule identifies the corresponding return  tuples by taking the 
“difference” between two sets of return  tuples. The functional dependency inference 
rule is introduced to  simulate the schema level inference detection scheme.
Once the corresponding return  tuples between two queries are identified, the user 
can generate inferred queries w ithout directly issuing them  to  the database. For 
example, the user can infer a new query with returning tuple “common” to  bo th  
queries, or a new query th a t returns tuples from one query bu t not from another 
query. The user can also combine several queries into a single query. The effect 
of applying inference rules to  unions of queries will be discussed later. Essentially, 
the five inference rules cover the set intersection, difference and union relationships 
between two sets of return  tuples.
W hen the user issues a query, the inference detection system compare it w ith 
previously issued queries and inferred queries, and applies inference rules when ap­
propriate. An occurrence of inference will result in either the modification of the 
existing queries, or the generation of new inferred queries. These may trigger further 
applications of the inference rules. Hence, the inference rules are applied repeatedly 
until no new inference occurs. This is a  term inating process as the number of infer­
ences th a t can occur is bounded by the size of the database. W hen two users are 
suspected of cooperating in performing inference, the inference detection system can 
be run against their combined set of queries.
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3 .3 .2  P relim in aries and N o ta tio n
Consider inference detection in a relation database with a single table (A database 
w ith multiple tables can be transform ed into a universal relation [33]). It is assumed 
th a t  the only way the user can learn about the d a ta  in the database is by issuing 
queries to  it.
Let Ai denote an a ttribu te  in the table, and a, denote an a ttribu te  value from 
the domain of A,. t[Ai] denotes the a ttribu te  value of a single tuple t over the 
a ttribu te  A,. A query is represented by a 2-tuple; (attribute-set, selection-criterion), 
where attribute-set is the set of attributes projected by the query, and selection- 
criterion is the logical expression th a t is satisfied by each return  tuple of the query. No 
aggregation function (for example, maximum and average) is allowed in the a ttribu te- 
set. In general, Q, refers to  the query {AS,; S Q } . \Qi\ denotes the set of return  
tuples of Qi- For each query Qi, ASi  is expanded with an a ttribu te  A, when “A, =  a / ’ 
appears in SCi as a conjunct. A query Q is a “partial query” if the user can determ ine 
IQI, but not all return  tuples of Q. “fl” , “U” , and “\ ” stand for the set intersection, 
union and difference operation respectively.
D efinition 3.3.1 A tuple t over a set of attributes A S  “satisfies” a logical expression 
E  i f  E  is evaluated to true when each occurrence of Ai in E  is instantiated with t[Ai], 
for  all Ai in A S .  t “contradicts” with E  i f  E  is evaluated to false.
For example, the tuple (35,60A ) th a t is projected over {Age, Salary)  satisfies 
E  = {Age >  30 A Salary < 70A);while the  tuple (25,50K) projected over the 
same set of attribu tes contradicts with E .  The tuple {AbK, M anager)  projected 
over {Salary, Job) neither satisfies nor contradicts E .  This is because after the  in­
stantiation, E  becomes {Salary < 70K) whose tru th  is undermined.
D efinition 3.3.2 Given two queries, Qi and Q 2 , we say that Qi is “subsumed” by
1. SC i  —>■ S C 2 ,’ or
2 . for each tuple ti  in Q i, ti  satisfies S C 2 .
where —>■ is the logical implication. CL is a reflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive 
relation. A return tuple ti  “relates” to another return tuple fg i f  then two tuples are 
selected from the same tuple in the database. Hence, Qi d  Q 2 implies that for  each 
return tuple t \  o f Qi, there is a return tuple of Q 2 , such that H relates to (2 -
When evaluating a logical implication, we need to  consider the integrity constraints 
th a t hold in the database. Consider the following implication,
(age > 18 A oge < 35) —» (oge > 20 A oge <  50),
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which is false. Suppose the youngest person in the database is 22 years old. By 
adding this constraint to both sides of the implication, it becomes,
({age >  18 A age < 35) A {age > 22)) {{age >  20 A age < 50) A {age > 22)) =  
{age >  22 A age < 35) —» {age >  22 A age <  50), 
which is true.
D e fin itio n  3 .3 .3  A return tuple ti  of Qi is “indistinguishable” from a return tuple 
(2 0/ Q 2
1. fo r  all Ai in {ASi  f l  A S 2 ), A [A,] =  t 2 [Ai];
2 . t i  does not contradict with S C 2 ; and
3. Î2 does not contradict with S C \.
t i  is “distinguishable” from  (2 i f t i  is not distinguishable from t 2 -
Intuitively, t\  is indistinguishable from t 2 if it is not possible to  conclude th a t 
ti  and fg are selected from two different tuples in the database. Two tuples th a t 
relate to  each other are indistinguishable from each other, while two tuples th a t are 
indistinguishable from each other does not imply th a t they relate to  each other.
3.3 .3  In ference R ules
As mentioned above, five inference rules are summarized. They are illustrated by 
using the sample database as shown in Table 3.1. The user is allowed to access 
all d a ta  in the database. However, it is suspicious if the user can infer the salaries 
of employees. We assume th a t the  security policy is to  determine if the user can 
infer the associations between N a m e  and Salary.  In general, the policy can specify 
detecting inferences of any association among the a ttributes. Unless otherwise stated, 
all queries appear in the inference rules are not partial queries.
Name Job Age Salary Departm ent Office
Alice Manager 35 60K Marketing 2nd Floor
Bob Secretary 35 45K Marketing 2nd Floor
Charles Secretary 40 40K Production 1st Floor
Denise Manager 45 65K Sales 2nd Floor
Table 3.1: Sample D atabase
1. Subsum e inference Given two queries Q\ and Q 2 , such th a t Qi C
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• S I l If there is an a ttribu te  A  in (ASg\ASi), such th a t all return  tuples of 
Q2 take the same a ttribu te  value a over A, then  for each return  tuple of 
Qi. fi[A] =  a. Qi may be a partial query.
•  SI2 If there is a return  tuple t i  of Qi  th a t is indistinguishable from one 
and only one return  tuple fg of Q 2 , then t i  relates to  fg- Qi may be a 
partial query.
• SI3 Let S  be the set of retu rn  tuple of Q 2 th a t are distinguishable from 
the return  tuples of Qi. If |S | =  ( |0g | -  |O il), then two inferred queries 
are generated: (ASg; SCgA^SCi) with S  as the set of return  tuples, and 
(ASg;SCg A SCi)  with (Qg \  S)  as the set of return  tuples. If \S\ < 
(IO2 I —lOil), then an inferred partial query is generated: (ASg; SCgA^SCi) 
with S  as the partial set of return  tuples.
Qi  C Q 2 implies th a t for each re tu rn  tuple t i  of Qi,  there is a return  tuple fg of 
O 2, such th a t fl relates to fg. S I l  says th a t when all return  tuples of Qg share 
a common attribu te  value, say a, over an a ttribu te  A, the user can infer th a t  
each return  tuple of Qi also takes the a ttribu te  value a over the a ttribu te  A. 
For example, consider the following two queries:
C l =  (Age; N am e  =  “Alice”)
Q 2 =  [Department] Age < 40)
Qi  returns a single tuple (35) which says th a t Alice is 35 years old. Q 2 returns 
two tuples (M arketing)  and (M arketing)  which shows th a t all employees at 
the age less than  40 work in the  M arketing departm ent. By 511, Alice works 
in the Marketing departm ent.
512 says th a t if fg is the only retu rn  tuple of Q 2 th a t is indistinguishable from 
a return  ti of Q\, then t\  relates to  fg. Consider the following two queries:
Cs =  [Age] N a m e  = “C harles”)
Qi  =  (Age, Salary, Age > 40)
C 3 returns a single tuple fg =  (40) which says th a t Charles is 40 years old. Qi  
returns two tuples (40, 40N) and (45,65N ) which says th a t there are only two 
employees who are a t the age greater than  or equal to  40. As Q 3 C Qi  and 
(40,40N) is the only return tuple of Q4  th a t is indistinguishable from C, by 
512, Charles earns 40N.
513 says th a t if a user identifies all the return  tuples of Q 2 th a t relate to  the 
return  tuples of Q\, then the user can infer these two queries: (A5g; 5C i A 5Cg) 
which includes return  tuples of Qg th a t relate to  the return  tuples of Q\,  and 
(A5g; 5CgA“'5C i) which includes return  tuples of Qg th a t do not relate to  the 
return  tuples of Qi. Continue from the above example on Qg and Qi, after the 
application of 512, the following two inferred queries are generated:
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Q 21 = {Age, Salary, N a m e  = “Charles” A Age > 40)
Q 22 =  (Age, Salary] N a m e  ^  “Charles” A Age >  40)
C 21 returns a single tuple (40,40K ), and C 22 returns a single tuple (45,65K). 
The two inferred queries together contains more information than  Qg- For 
example, Q 22  says th a t the  employee who is at the age of 45 and earns 65K  
m ust be someone other th an  Charles.
2. U n iq u e  c h a ra c te r is t ic  in fe ren c e
D e fin itio n  3 .3 .4  A logical expression E  is a unique characteristic of a tuple t 
i f f  t  is the only tuple in the database that satisfies E .
For example, if Alice is the only manager a t the age of 35, the {Job = “M anager” A 
Age = 35) is the unique characteristic of Alice in the database.
Given a tuple t i  with unique characteristic C\ in a database D, and another 
tuple tg w ith unique characteristic Cg in D . If Ci —» Cg, Cg —» Ci, or Ci Cg, 
then ti  relates to  fg in D.
For example, the query
{Salary] Job — “M anager” A Age <  40)
returns a single tuple {60K). This query together with the above unique char­
acteristic of Alice implies Alice earns 60K.  Unique characteristic inference is 
a special case of the subsume inference. Suppose (A5i; UCi)  returns a single 
tuple t i ,  and (A5g; UCg) returns a single tuple fg. Then, UC\ is the unique 
characteristic of H, and UCg is the unique characteristic of fg. If UCi —+ t/Cg, 
UC 2 UCi, ov UCi UC 2 holds, then  by 5 /2 , U relates to  fg.
If all inferred queries are identified, unique characteristics are determined as 
follows,
•  if Qi returns all bu t one tuple t in the database, then  the unique charac­
teristic of t is (^SCi)
•  if Qi and Qj have only one overlapping return  tuple t, then t  has the unique 
characteristic (5 Q  A SCj).
• if Qi returns one more tuple t than  Q j , then the unique characteristic of t 
is (5QA-"5Cj).
where both Qi and Qj are not partial queries.
3. O v e rla p p in g  in fe ren c e  Given n  queries Q i , . . . ,  Qn, where n >=  3.
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• O i l  Let S  be the set of retu rn  tuples of Qg th a t are indistinguishable from 
the return  tuples of If Qi  C Qg, Qi C Qs, |5 | =  |Q i|, and fg is the 
only return  tuple of Qg th a t is indistinguishable from a return  tuple tg of 
Qz, then fg relates to  tg. Qi may be a partial query.
• 012  Let Q S  = Qg , . . . ,  Qn- Suppose for each Qi in QS, Qi C Qi, and the 
return tuples of Qi are indistinguishable from the return  tuples of a t most 
one other query in QS.  Also, the to tal number of indistinguishable tuples 
in all queries in Q S  is equal to  (2 x (|Qg| +  . . .  +  |Q„| — |Q il)). For any 
two queries Qj and Qk in QS,  if tj is the only return  tuple of Qj th a t is 
indistinguishable from a return  tuple ffc of Qfc- Qi may be a partial query.
•  W hen all relating tuples between Qi and Qj are identified, three inferred 
queries are generated (possibly partial): {ASp, SCiA'^SCj),  {ASj; SCjA~'SCi),  
and (A5j fi ASj] SCi  A SCj) .
4. C o m p le m e n ta ry  in fe re n c e  Suppose there are four queries, Qi, Qg, Qg and 
Q 4 , where Qi  C Qg, and Q 3 C Qi. Also, suppose th a t the  retu rn  tuples of 
Qi th a t relate to  the retu rn  tuples of Qg are identified (for example, using the 
overlapping inference rule), and similarly for those between Qg and Qi. If one 
of the following three conditions holds:
•  for each re tu rn  tuple t \  of Qi th a t does not relate to  any return  tuple of 
Qg, ti  is distinguishable from all return  tuples of Q4
•  04 c  Qg
•  I0 3 I =  I0 4 I
then Q[ c  0g , where Q[ =  {ASp, 5CiA'^5Cg), and 0g =  (A5g; 5Cg A
5. F u n c tio n a l d e p e n d e n c y  in fe ren ce  Suppose th a t a ttribu te  A i  functional de­
termines a ttribu te  Ag, and there exists a tuple t, such th a t  t[Ai] = Oi and 
t[Ag] =  ag. If there is a tuple ti, such th a t t fA i ]  = ai, then f, [Ag] =  og. The 
same applies when Ai or Ag is a composite a ttribu te  (i.e, a group of a ttributes).
3.3 .4  Inference w ith  U n io n  Q ueries
Union queries is a special case when handling the inference problem. Consider the 
following three queries,
Qi = [Job] Age  <  50 A Age > 40)
0 2  =  [Job] Age  >  45 A Age < 60)
0 3  =  (Job; Age >  30 A Age <  45)
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since the following implication holds.
(Age <  50 A Age > 40) {{Age >  45 A Age < 60) V {Age >  30 A Age < 45)),
0 1  C ( 0 2  U 0 3 ) holds.
The inference rules can still be applied by treating ( 0 2  U 0 3 ) as a single user 
query. We call such a union of queries a  “union query” . In contrast, a user query 
is called a  “simple query” . If 0 „  is a union query th a t consists Q i , . . . , Q j ,  then 
ASu = {ASi n  . . .  n  A Sj),  and SCu = {SCi V . . .  V SCj).  The applications of the 
unique characteristic and functional dependency inference rules on a union query 
are the same as their applications on the simple queries of the union query. Hence, 
we only consider the applications of the  subsume, overlapping and complementary 
inference rules on union queries.
Consider the  applications of the subsume inference rule on union queries. Suppose 
( 0 2  U 0 s )  C 0 1 . This implies th a t 0 2  C 0 i  and 03 C 0 i .  If the subsume inference 
rule is applicable due to  (0 2  U 0 3 ) C 0 i ,  then it is also applicable due to  0g  C 0 i  
and 03 C 0 1 . Hence, we do not need to  consider the application of the subsume 
inference rule when the union query occurs on the left hand side of a “C ” relation. 
Now suppose 0 1  C 0 „ , where 0 „  is a union query. The application of 5 /1  on union 
queries is the same as when only simply queries are involved. To apply 5 /2 , the user 
must have identified all the overlapping tuples among the simple query of 0 „ th a t 
correspond to the retu rn  tuples of 0 i .  The subsume inference rule can still be applied 
when the simple queries of 0 „ have no common projected attribute.
Consider the applications of the overlapping inference rule on union queries. 
Firstly, consider the application of 0 /1 .  If 0 „  C 0 i  is involved, |0 „ | m ust be known 
to the user. If 0 i  C 0 „  is involved, the user must has identified all the overlapping 
tuples among the simple queries of 0 „  th a t relate to  the return  tuples of 0 1 . Now 
consider the  application of 0 /2 .  If 0 „  C 0 i  is involved, the user m ust has identified 
all the overlapping tuples among the simple queries of 0 „ th a t relate to  the retu rn  
tuples of 0 1 . If 0 1  C Qu is involved, |0 u | m ust be known to the user. In either case, 
the a ttribu te  set of the  union query cannot be empty.
To apply the complementary inference rule on union queries, the overlapping 
tuples of the simple queries in the union query must have been identified. Also the 
attribute set of the union query cannot be empty.
3.3.5 P erform ance and R em arks
This m ethod identifies five inference rules: subsume, unique characteristic, overlap­
ping, complementary, and functional dependency. These rules are sound bu t they are 
not necessarily complete. A prototype of the inference detection system using Perl 
on a Sun SPARC 20 workstation. The preliminary results show th a t the system on 
average takes seconds to  process a query for a database of thousands of records.
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Although in theory detecting inferences a t data  level is an NP-hard problem, in 
practice, there are cases where the use of such approach is practical. In particular, 
the case when there is a limited amount of overlapping among the return  tuples of 
the queries can be solved efficiently.
3.4 The A pplication o f D ecision Trees to  th e In­
ference Problem
In m ethods mentioned above, when an a ttribu te  is removed from the dataset, all 
the values of th a t a ttribu te  are hidden from the generic users. If only some values 
of the sensitive a ttribu te  are classified, and consequently should be hidden for the 
sake of security, while the others should be released for the reason of performance 
and functionality, then how can the classified values be protected from unauthorized 
disclosure? The inference problem exists in this case because the relation between 
attribu tes is exposed to generic users due to  the exposure of some values in the 
sensitive attribu te. Generic user can conclude rules from the available dataset, and 
then  infer the  missing data  by applying those rules. Therefore, in most cases not only 
the sensitive values, but some non-sensitive values should be trim m ed off from the 
released dataset in order to  prevent the generic users from forming rules. It can be 
easily seen th a t there is a trade-off between functionality and security, which means 
more data  should be released as long as the classified d a ta  is well protected. In [10], 
a paradigm for dealing with the inference problem in this situation is presented.
3 .4 .1  Trade-off b etw een  F u n ction a lity  and Security
In this section, an example is quoted from [10] to explained more detail the trade-off 
between functionality and security of a database. High represents users of higher 
security classifications and the da ta  set available for them , and Low, the users of 
lower security classification and the modified data  set available for them  (see Table 
3.2, Table 3.3). W hen High wishes to  downgrade a set of d a ta  to  Low, it may be 
necessary to  trim  the set, where a question m ark represents a missing value.
It is necessary for High to  downgrade to  Low the first eight rows in their entirety, 
and the ninth row with the result missing. Low uses only the first eight rows of its 
database to  form its rules because th a t they are the only complete rows (tuples). 
Rows th a t are downgraded in their entirety are referred as the base set, see Table 3.4.
Can High assume th a t the information it tried to keep hidden from Low is still 
hidden? If Low if stupid, then  this is true. However, if Low analyzes the base set. 
Low will find out th a t every blonde who did not use lotion got burned. Since Tony 
is a blonde who did not use lotion. Low knows th a t Tony got burned. We formalize 
this rule as
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Name Hair Height Weight Lotion Result
Hillary blonde average light no burned
Janet blonde tall average yes no
Bill brown short average yes no
Tipper blonde short average no burned
Newt red average heavy no burned
Ken brown tall heavy no no
Al brown average heavy no no
Paula blonde short light yes no
Tony blonde average heavy no burned
Table 3.2: High D atabase
Name Hair Height Weight Lotion Result
Hillary blonde average light no burned
Janet blonde tall average yes no
Bill brown short average yes no
Tipper blonde short average no burned
Newt red average heavy no burned
Ken brown tall heavy no no
Al brown average heavy no no
Paula blonde short light yes no
Tony blonde average heavy no ?
Table 3.3: Low D atabase =  Downgrade
Name Hair Height Weight Lotion Result
Hillary blonde average light no burned
Janet blonde tall average yea no
Bill brown short average yes no
Tipper blonde short average no burned
Newt red average heavy no burned
Ken brown tall heavy no no
Al brown average heavy no no
Paula blonde short light yes no
Table 3.4: Base Set
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Name Hair Height Weight Lotion Result
Hillary blonde average light ^ no burned
Janet blonde tall average yes no
Bill brown short average yes no
Tipper blonde short average ? burned
Newt red average heavy no burned
Ken brown tall heavy no no
AI brown average heavy no no
Paula blonde short light yes no
Tony blonde average heavy no ?
Table 3.5: Low D atabase =  Reduced Downgrade
{hair = blonde) A {lotion = no) = >  {result =  burned)
Now how can High prevent this? One option is not to  downgrade any information, 
bu t this is a little b it overkill. Instead, High should decide what not to  downgrade 
based on the rules th a t it thinks Low can infer, and on the importance of the infor­
m ation th a t Low should receive. If the  information is of trivial value, it might also 
send incorrect da ta  to  Low (only for some a ttribu te  values) to  impinge upon Low’s 
ability to  infer rules and therefore infer High information. High could decide not to 
downgrade both H illary N o t io n  = no  and Tipper N o t io n  = no. Then Low could not 
determine the above rule and the result concerning Tony would not be apparent to 
Low. W hat is the impact of not downgrading the information about Hillary’s and 
T ipper’s lotion? If for functionality and performance reasons. Low m ust have this 
information, then there is a problem. If the importance of the information about 
Hillary’s and T ipper’s lotion is so great, perhaps it is worth compromising the infor­
mation about Tony’s lotion use. This is worth thinking about. Security, as has been 
noted in [31], need not be a  yes/no world. Perhaps it is extremely im portant for Low 
to know th a t Hillary did not use lotion bu t it is not really im portant for Low to know 
about Tripper’s lotion use. Then High could downgrade everything as in Table 3.3 
with the exception of Tipper N otion ,  as in Table 3.5, for the Low database. How 
does this impact Low’s rule making process?
Now we form the reduced base set, see Table 3.6. Unlike the original base set given 
in Table 3.4, we still include a row even though there is an unknown a ttribu te  value. 
This is because the result is still visible to  Low. It is possible, though, th a t High 
decides to  keep the result unknown to Low, then th a t row should not be included in 
the reduced base set because it would not assist Low in forming a rule. Note th a t using 
the reduced base set in Table 3.6 and deleting the Tipper row, the same rules as before 
would still be generated. However, the confidence in the rules concerning blondes has
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Name Hair Height Weight Lotion Result
Hillary ^ blonde average light no burned
Janet blonde tall average yes no
Bill brown short average yes no
Tipper blonde short average V burned
Newt red average heavy no burned
Ken brown tall heavy no no
A1 brown average heavy no no
Paula blonde short light yes no
Table 3.6: Reduced Base Set
decreased, because the data  backing our rule has decreased. The data, bo th  in quality 
and quantity, should affect which rules are generated and the confidence in these rules.
3.4 .2  D ecision  Tree A n alysis
From the above example, we can see th a t the trade-off between functionality and 
security of a database plays a critical role when deciding the d a ta  set to  be downgraded 
to  Low. Therefore, measurements against both  the functionality and the security are 
critical. In [10], Chang and Moskowitz suggest decision tree analysis as a measurement 
against the security of a database.
Consider the base set as given in Table 3.3. An information theoretical approach 
[56] is used to  generate the decision trees. Shannon [60] [59] first pu t information 
theory on a firm foundation. His concept of entropy and m utual information are 
im portant to  th is method. The columns Hair, Height, W eight,  and Lotion  make 
up the attributes. We wish to  see which has the greatest influence upon the result. 
To determine th is we use the  condition entropy. Let A  be the random  variable rep­
resenting an a ttribu te  (we have four choices for this random  variable) which takes on 
the values a, and let R  be the random  variable representing the  result which takes 
on the values r i =  burned, and — not burned. We need to  determine the m utual 
information I{R , A) between the  result and the a ttribu te  (use base two for the logs):
where
and
=  -  Y ^ P h ) lo g p ( r j )
j
Lf(R|A) =  - ^ p ( a i ) ^ p ( r j |o i ) l o g p ( r j |
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Hair
Blond Red Browr
Figure 3.16: The First Branching
The probabilities are determined by a frequency count based on the data. The 
a ttribu te  th a t has the most effect upon the result is the a ttribu te  th a t  has the greatest 
m utual information. Since H (R )  is constant and H (R )  > H (R \A ) ,  the optim ization 
condition is equivalent to  finding the a ttribu te  th a t minimizes the conditional entropy 
H (R\A).  Thus we have the following:
Gain Condition[56]: Find A  such th a t H {R\A)  is minimized.
Let us take the first a ttribu te  A  =  Hair, ai — blonde, Og =  brown, 03 =  red. This 
gives us
H {R\A)  =  log I  +  I  lo g |]  -  | [ |  log I  +  I  log |]  -  i [ l  log Y +  f  log j] =  .5 
Similarly, we see tha t H{R \H eight)  =  .69, H {R \W eigh t)  =  .94, and H{R\Lotion) = 
.61. Thus we see th a t the a ttribu te  th a t has the most influence upon Result  is H air .  
See Figure 3.16.
Now we must repeat the process for each node, until there are no more decisions 
to be made. Since every Red  is B urned,  and every B row n  is not Burned, those 
decisions are done. However, blonde is still not decided upon so we m ust find another 
attribu te th a t “maximally” influences result. See Figure 3.17.
Now we must repeat the gain condition but we restrict ourselves to  the blondes. 
So we m ust minimize H {R\A),  where A  =  Height, W eigh t  or Lotion. Let us try  
Lotion, ÜX = no, and «2 =  yes. So,
H{R\Lotion, H air  = Blonde) =  -  | [ |  log |  +  |  log |]  -  |[§  log § +  |  log |]  =  0 
We need not calculate any other conditional entropies. All they  can do is tie (but 
they do not). So the next a ttribu te  we put down as a node is Lotion. See Figure 
3T8.
Now we can read off the following four rules:
[hair =  blonde) A {lotion =  no) {result ~  burned)
{hair = blonde) A {lotion = yes) =4> {result =  not burned)
{hair = brown) =4> {result = not burned)
{hair = red) =4- {result = burned)
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Blonde Red Brown








Figure 3.18: Decision Tree
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We see th a t the first rule is the obvious one th a t we discussed before.
3 .4 .3  R em arks
Decision rules have been proven to  be fruitful and accurate predictors in the  AI 
world [57] [77]. They are computationally feasible and they have a firm information 
theoretical foundation. As a measurement against the security of a database, decision 
analysis reflects the change of confidence upon decision rules between data  set before 
and after modification. Although Chang and Moskowitz fail to  define a practical 
measurement against the functionality of a database, their idea of evaluating these 
two aspects of a database indicates a new direction to  resolve the inference problem.
3.5 A Schem e U sing R ough Sets and Entropy to  
H andle the Inference Problem
In [14], we propose an integrated scheme to handle the inference problem based on 
rough sets and entropy functions. Previous efforts [9] [10] [45] gave us inspiration for 
developing our scheme. In [9], Bayesian networks are used to  form decision rules 
from dataset, and in [10], decision trees analysis is used for the same purpose. B ut 
none of them  presents an integrated solution like ours. Our scheme provides explicit 
com putational m ethods to  evaluate both  security and functionality of the dataset.
3.5.1 O utline o f th e  Schem e
From the discussion in previous section, it can be seen th a t the optimal solution for 
the inference problem should maximize both  the  security and the functionality. Our 
scheme is proposed for this purpose. We will use rough sets and entropies for explicit 
computations of the security and the functionality. Based on these com putations, 
we can obtain an optimal solution. Using our scheme, the procedure of handling the 
inference problem can be described as follows.
1. Identify and trim off sensitive information from the dataset for  generic users. 
This step depends on the types of database and the users. We will not discuss 
this in detail in this paper.
2. Evaluate the security of the dataset.
Use rough sets theory to  form a set of decision rules R  from the dataset (See 
section 3.5.2). If the sensitive information cannot be inferred by employing 
the decision rules, in other words, there is no inference problem existing in the 
dataset, end the procedure. Otherwise, go to  step 3.
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3. Find out all the possible values which will cause inference problems.
Prom decision rules in step 2 and the sensitive values identified in step 1, find 
out all the possible candidates which may cause the inference problem. Note 
th a t usually, there will be different choices of these values. We will discuss th a t  
in section 3.5.2.
4. Choose the values to be hidden.
Determine the values need to  be hidden in order to  reduce the inference problem. 
We will use entropy functions to  compute the functionality of the modified 
dataset and find out the right values to  be hidden. The details are discussed in 
section 3.5.3.
5. Reevaluate the security of the modified dataset.
Use rough sets to  get a new set of decision rules for the  modified dataset. 
This would end in two possible cases. One is th a t the new decision rules are 
different from the old rules, such th a t the sensitive information can no longer 
be inferred, which means the  sensitive information is well protected. The other 
case is th a t the generic users may still infer the sensitive information by applying 
the decision rules, bu t the probability of conducting a right inference is reduced. 
In case th a t the decreasing is not satisfied, go back to  step 3.
6 . Evaluate the modified dataset.
Consider the change in security and in functionality according to  the require­
ments of real application. If it is viewed as balanced, end the  procedure. O th ­
erwise, repeat the procedure from step 3.
Since we want our scheme to  be com putationally explicit, the  main point is to  
quantify the security and the functionality of a dataset. For this purpose, we introduce 
rough sets and information theory to  estim ate these two aspects respectively. By 
analyzing the changes in them, the optim al solution can be computed.
In the next two sections, we show some details of our scheme.
3.5.2 M aking D ecision  R u les
Consider the following example, which is modified from [53]. In Table 3.7, a ttr ib u te  a 
represents “age” with values of “1: young, 2; pre-presbyopic, 3: presbyopic” ; a ttr ib u te  
b means “spectacle” w ith values of “1 : myope, 2 : hyperm étrope” ; a ttribu te  c is 
“astigmatic” with values of “1 : no, 2 : yes” ; a ttribu te  d is “tear production ra te” w ith 
values of “T. reduced, 2; normal” ; a ttribu te  e is “the optician’s decision” with values 
of “1: hard contact lenses, 2: soft contact lenses, 3: no contact lenses” .
Suppose for the reason of security, the value of e of patient 13 is classified as 
sensitive for the generic users, and the  other values are not (See Table 3.8, in which 
the classified value is replaced by a question mark).
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u a b c d 6 U a b c d e
1 1 1 2 2 1 21 1 2 1 1 3
2 1 2 2 2 1 22 1 2 1 1 3
3 1 2 2 2 1 23 1 2 1 3
4 1 2 2 2 1 24 2 1 1 1 3
5 2 1 2 2 1 25 2 1 1 1 3
6 3 1 2 2 1 26 2 1 1 3
7 3 1 2 2 1 27 2 2 1 1 3
8 1 1 1 2 2 28 2 2 1 1 3
9 1 2 1 2 2 29 2 2 1 1 3
10 1 2 1 2 2 30 2 2 1 1 3
11 2 1 1 2 2 31 2 2 1 3
12 2 1 1 2 2 32 2 2 3
13 2 1 1 2 2 33 3 1 1 1 3
14 2 2 1 2 2 34 3 1 1 1 3
15 3 2 1 2 2 35 3 1 1 3
16 3 2 1 2 2 36 3 1 1 3
17 1 1 1 1 3 37 3 2 1 1 3
18 1 1 2 1 3 38 3 2 1 1 3
19 1 1 2 1 3 39 3 2 2 1 3
20 1 1 2 1 3 40 3 2 2 2 3
Table 3.7; Original Database
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u a b c d e
1 1 1 2 2 1
9 1 2 1 2 2
10 1 2 1 2 2
11 2 1 1 2 2
12 2 1 1 2 2
13 2 1 1 2 7
14 2 2 1 2 2
15 3 2 1 2 2
40 3 2 2 2 3
Table 3.8: Modified D atabase
For the definition of rough set and its application to  data  reasoning, readers are 
referred to  [53].
We use the 39 complete records in Table 3.8 to form decision rules. Table 3.8 can 
be viewed as a decision table in which (a, b, c, d} are condition attributes, whereas 
{e} is the  decision a ttribu te. The aim is to  com pute the minimal set of decision 
rules associated with this decision table. To do th a t, we first simplify the decision 
table by eliminating duplicate rows. Since all condition attribu tes in the table are 
different, according to  rough sets theory in reasoning about data, we say th a t there is 
a to ta l dependency between the condition attribu tes and the decision a ttribu te, i.e. 
the dependency {a, b, c, d} =» {e} is valid.
Then we need to  compute the reduction of the set of condition attributes necessary 
to define the decision attribu te. We can do th a t by removing one condition a ttribu te  
at a time from the table, and check if the reduced table becomes inconsistent. I t  is 
readily checked th a t in this example none of condition attribu tes can be removed. 
Hence the set of condition a ttribu tes is e-independent.
Now we need to  check whether we can eliminate some superfluous values of condi­
tion attributes. To this end, we have to  find out which values of condition a ttribu tes 
are indispensable in order to  discern the values of the decision attribute. We know 
the value core (see [53]) is the set of all indispensable values with respect to e. To 
check whether a specific value is dispensable or not, we have to  remove the value 
from the table and see if the remaining values in the  same row uniquely determine 
the decision attribu te  value in th is row. If not, this value belongs to  the core. All 
core values of each decision rule are given in Table 3.9.
Knowing all the core values, we can easily compute reducts of each decision rule 
by adding to  the core values of each decision rule values of condition attributes of the 
rule such th a t the predecessor of the rule is independent and the rule is true. Reducts
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u a b c d 6 U a b 0 d 6
1 - - 2 2 1 13 - - - 1 3
2 1 - 2 2 1 14 - - - 1 3
3 - 1 2 2 1 15 - - - 1 3
4 - 1 2 2 1 16 - - - 1 3
5 - - 1 2 2 17 - - - - 3
6 - - 1 2 2 18 2 2 2 - 3
7 2 - 1 2 2 19 - - - - 3
8 - - 1 2 2 20 3 1 1 - 3
9 - 2 1 2 2 21 - - - 1 3
10 - - - 1 3 22 - - - 1 3
11 - - - 1 3 23 - - - - 3
12 - - - 1 3 24 3 2 2 - 3
Table 3.9: Core Values of Decision Rules
of each decision rule are listed in Table 3.10.
U a b c d e U a b c d e
1 X 1 2 2 1 13 X X X 1 3
T 1 X 2 2 1 14 X X X 1 3
2 1 X 2 2 1 15 X X X 1 3
3 X 1 2 2 1 16 X X X 1 3
4 X 1 2 2 1 17 X X X 1 3
5 1 X 1 2 2 17' 2 2 2 X 3
6 1 X 1 2 2 18 2 2 2 X 3
6' X 2 1 2 2 19 3 1 1 X 3
7 2 X 1 2 2 19' X X X 1 3
8 2 X 1 2 2 20 3 1 1 X 3
8' X 2 1 2 2 21 X X X 1 3
9 X 2 1 2 2 22 X X X 1 3
10 X X X 1 3 23 X X X 1 3
11 X X X 1 3 23' 3 2 2 X 3
12 X X X 1 3 24 3 2 2 X 3
Table 3.10: Reducts of Decision Rules
It is easy to  find the minimal set of decision rules now. We can get it by removing 
superfluous rules from Table 3.10. Thus the  final result can be w ritten as: 
aiC2d,2 —> e p  biPzdg e\ 
aiC\d2 —> 6 2 ] a2C\d2 —> eg; bgCidg —> eg
 ̂eg; ogbgCg —> eg; agftiCi —>■ eg; ogbgCg —> eg
Combining all decision rules for one decision class, we get the following decision 
rules:
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R ule  1 : (ai V 6 1 )0 2 ^ 2  ei
Rule  2 ; (oi V 0 2  V 6 g)cid2  —̂ eg
RuZe 3 : di V (ogbiCi) V ((og V a3)()2Cg) eg
• Find Out Inference Values
Now we come back to  the inference problem. Our purpose is to  hide the rule 
R ule h : ogbiCidg —̂ eg. To do th a t, we use the decision rules obtained to 
“decompose” the hiding rule as follows. Basically, we consider the “and” for 
R ule h and the decision rules of the dataset.
From R ule  1 and Rule h we obtain a rule 
From R ule  2 and Rule h we obtain a rule 
From R ule  3 and Rule h we obtain a rule
Rule hi : b^dg —+ e i V  eg.
Rule  /ig : agCidg eg.
Rule  bg : Og V biCi — eg V eg.
The decomposition gives us strong information th a t the rule UgCidg —> eg causes 
inference problems. This rule involves records 11,12, and 14. For each of these 
three records, a t least one value of the a ttribu tes a, c ,d  or e should be hidden. 
At this point, we still cannot decide which value to  be hidden. We will discuss 
how to  choose the values to  be hidden in the next section.
After the chosen values are hidden, we repeat the above process to  make the 
decision rules for the modified dataset. If there is some conflict in making 
decision rules or the new rules cannot decompose R ule h into a meaningful 
solution, then we solve the inference problem.
In Table 3.11, 3 more values are hidden from Table 3.8. Using the same m ethod 
to  compute the decision rules, we will find th a t the  R ule hi and Rule  Ag are 
unchanged, bu t Rule  hg is changed to: Cidg —> eg. Therefore it is difficult to 
find R ule h from the modified dataset.
3.5 .3  Q uantify ing  In form ation  in D atab ases
In this section, we show how to  use “entropy” to  evaluate the  amount of information 
contained in a database. In [59] [60], entropy is defined as a measure of the am ount of 
information contained in an information source. The entropy function is defined as:
where {p i,. . .  ,Pi) is a probability distribution (using base 2 logarithms). 
Intuitively, a table containing some missing values provides less information than  
a table without any missing values. We can use the probability to measure the 
availability of data. Suppose we select a random  entry in a table. W hat is the 
probability th a t  the value is not missing? If the table has no missing value, then  
the probability is 1. Otherwise, we can compute the probability by counting the
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u a b c d e
1 1 1 2 2 1
9 1 2 1 2 2
10 1 2 1 2 2
11 7 1 1 2 2
12 2 1 7 2 2
13 2 1 1 2 7
14 2 2 1 7 2
15 3 2 1 2 2
40 3 2 2 2 3
Table 3.11; Further Modified Database
missing values. However, since we are under the circumstance of databases, it is 
more complicated th an  tables or regular information source. We have to  consider the 
distribution of missing values in rows and in columns. Therefore, we need to evaluate 
the amount of information with respect to  bo th  rows and columns. We use and 
He to  represent them  respectively. If there are r  rows in the dataset, then define 
H r  —  — Y l \ = \ V i  log Pi, where p, is the  probability of availability of the  ith  row. If no 
value is missing, then  Pi =  y for each i. If some value is missing in fth  row, then  
Pi < \- He is defined in a similar way.
For example, consider the database in Table 3.8 and the trim m ed version presented 
in Table 3.11.
The entropies of the Table 3.8 are:
H r  =  39 X V  X I  X log ( y  X  | )  +  ^  X I  X log ( y  X  | )  =  5.302 
He =  4 X 1 X ^  X log (y X ^ )  +  1 X ^  X log (y X =  2.318 
The entropies of Table 3.11 are:
H: =  36 X ^  X I X lo g (^  X I) +  4 X ^  X I X log (^  X I) =  5.242 
H: =  1 X §  X lo g ( | X |g) +  4 X 1 X §  X lo g ( | X § )  =  2.304 
The entropy function has the property th a t  the value of the function increases 
when the probability becomes evener. For instance, if we hide the  value of a ttribu te  
a of record 12 and 14 instead, then  the H ' of Table 3.11 would be 2.303.
Finally, we define the information rates of the database as IR r  =  H r/lo g  r  and 
I  Re =  H e /loge, which reflects the availability of information in a database, i.e. 
the functionality of a database. Therefore, IR r  =  0.996 and I  Re =  0.998, while 
7Æ =  0.985 and 7H. =  0.992.
Hiding Values
In the previous subsection we find more values should be hidden from generic
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users in order to  protect the classified information. It remains to  explain how 
to  choose those values?
We will use information rates to  decide the missing values. For each of the 
possible choices, we compute the information rates of the modified dataset. 
We will choose one modification which keeps the information ra te  as large as 
possible, in other words, the modification th a t has the largest entropies. We 
already know th a t the entropy function has the property th a t the  evener the 
distribution, the larger the entropy. L et’s take a look a t the Table 3.8, from 
section 3.5.2, we decide to  hide one value of a ttribu te  a, c ,d  or e in record 11,12 
and 14. There are 64 (P jP fP j)  ways to  do that. Among those choices, there 
are 24 (P fP fP f)  even distributions, Table 3.11 shows one of them . We already 
computed th a t IR r  =  0.985 and IR c — 0.992. If we hide uneven distributed 
values in this example, we will find th a t the value of IR c  slightly smaller.
In real applications the im portance of different attributes usually varies. So in 
practice, we can also consider th a t factor in determining which vales to  hide. By 
employing our m ethod and considering the importance of attributes, an optim al 
solution can be determined.
3.5 .4  R em arks
This section presents a new scheme for handling inference problems, which consid­
ers both  security and functionality of a dataset. The scheme uses two main tools. 
One is the application of rough sets to  form a minimal set of decision rules from the 
dataset. The other is the use of entropy, an im portant concept from information the­
ory, to evaluate the amount of information contained in the dataset. By analyzing the 
changes of confidence in decision rules and in the amount of information, an optim al 
solution can be decided. The scheme is explicit and also easy to  be implemented.
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C hapter 4 
R em oval o f Inferences
In this chapter, we introduce two dynamic techniques to  remove the inference prob­
lem after all inference channels have been identified. They can be combined with 
techniques in detecting the inference channels, such as the techniques introduced in 
last chapter, to  form an integrated solution for this problem.
4.1 D ynam ic Inference Control
In [65], dynamic control is proposed to  handle the inference problem. This m ethod 
considers the trade-off between the granularity of the access control and the query 
processing time.
This m ethod allows for fast query processing while enabling fine-grained access 
control, and thus, flexible information access. To do this, access-enabling tokens are 
used to associate with objects in the database, and users are allocated keys th a t they  
use to generate the necessary tokens. Once a token is used to  query an object, the  key 
it was derived from cannot be used to  query any other object in the inference channel. 
This is implemented by deleting the tokens generated with this key from other objects 
in the channel. Hence, query processing depends on the length of the channel rather 
than the ever-growing user query histories. In addition, because initially the same 
tokens are associated with each object, it allows for flexible information access. A 
user can access any objects in the inference channel provided doing so will not enable 
the user to  make the undesired inference, even through collusion with other users.
4.1.1 P relim inaries
Let n  denote the number of users of the database, and U i , . .. ,Un denote the users 
themselves. Let m  denote the number of objects in an inference channel, and O i , . . . ,  0„  
denote the objects in the channel. An inference channel of length m  is sometimes
54
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referred as an m — channel.
In the initialization phase, users receive a set of encryption keys th a t they use to  
prove authorization to  access the objects in an inference channel. Users prove th is 
by encrypting some information specific to their object of interest. Let denote 
the set of keys allocated to  H , i — 1 , . . .  ,n,  each encryption key may be known to 
several users. Before any queries have been made, each encryption key can potentially 
be used to  access any object in the channel. However, users only have enough keys 
to  generate tokens for a proper subset of the objects in the channel. A user is said 
to  have maximally queried the channel if they have used all possible keys to query 
the channel. By limiting the number of keys per user, collusion resistance (Collusion 
resistance is th a t a coalition of users cannot together query all the  objects in the 
inference channel) is guaranteed.
D efinition 4.1.1 Let c he an integer, 0  < c < n. We say that an inference protection 
scheme is c-collusion resistant i f  c users acting in collusion are unable to query all 
the objects in any inference channel.
Once an encryption key is used to  gain access to  object Qt, the same key cannot 
be used to  gain access to any object Oj, j  i, in the same inference channel. This 
is accomplished by deleting the token generated by th a t key from the rest of the  
inference channel. In other words, part of the autom ated access control mechanism is 
to  update the list of acceptable tokens for objects in the inference channel each tim e 
an object in the channel is accessed. Hence, because a key may be used by many users, 
the queries of each user potentially affect the access capabilities of many users. For 
example, if two of the keys used to  query an object in the channel belong to  the same 
user, then this user will be unable to  maximally query the channel. These properties 
allow us to  achieve a property th a t we call crowd control: if a lot of users have queried 
a maximal portion of an inference channel (e.g. m  — 1 out of m  objects) then no user 
should be able to complete the inference channel by making the remaining query. The 
reasoning here is th a t if an object has been queried a lot, it is more likely to  have 
been leaked and so it may be prudent to  consider the query results to  be in the public 
domain. So, if this is the case for most of the channel, access to  the remaining object 
should be explicitly prohibited.
D e fin itio n  4 .1 .2  Let 0 < e <  1, and let U denote a randomly selected user. Consider 
a c-collusion resistant inference protection scheme. I f  when more than x  sets of a users 
have together queried some set of m  — 1  objects, , . . . ,  in inference channel
{ O i , . . . ,  Om}, then with probability at least 1—e, U cannot access the remaining object, 
{ O i , . . . ,  Om} — {Oim . . . ,  we say the scheme has {x, c, e)-crowd control.
Figure 4.1 is a high level example of how token sets, and consequently access con­
trol, changes as a result of user queries. It simplifies this approach in two ways. F irst,
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Figure 4.1: Dynamic Inference Control
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it does not show the keys each user receives, b u t rather just the tokens they generate 
from them  (depicted here as ovals). The second, and more im portant, simplification 
is th a t tokens corresponding to  different objects appear identical. In reality, the  to ­
kens are particular to  the object w ith which they are associated, while the encryption 
keys used to  generate them  may be the same. In this example there are four users 
each with two tokens (or, two keys th a t they use to generate tokens) and collusion 
resistance is c =  1. For i = 1,2,3,  the fth column indicates which tokens can be used 
to  access object O, after the queries listed on the  left hand side have been executed. 
After both Ui and t/g have queried objects Oi and Og, no one can query object O3 
(it has no more acceptable tokens) bu t everyone can still access both  Op and Og.
An im portant part of the analysis is assessing how information access changes as 
more users query the channel. To do this we need to  understand how one user’s set 
of keys relates to  another user’s set of keys. This is im portant because w ith each 
query the set of acceptable tokens for every other query can change. More precisely, 
we often study how much the key sets of one group of users, say U i , . .. ,Ur, cover the 
key set of user, Hr+i- The size of the  cover is the number of keys Ur+i has in common 
with at least one of U i,. . . ,U r ,  th a t is, the value; \Kr+i Ft (UL^7Q)|. Finally, for 
simplicity of exposition, it is assumed th a t a fractional quantity (i.e. | )  is an integer.
4.1 .2  D yn am ic Inference C ontrol
We assume th a t inference channels have been identified (for example, using a  tool 
such as [58] ) prior to  the deployment of this inference control scheme. The protocol 
consists of three phases:
1. Key allocation
Users are allocated { r r i m a x  — l ) / c  keys, where r U m a x  is the maximum length of 
an inference channel in the database, and c is the desired degree of collusion 
resistance.
2. Initialization of the database
For each inference channel Q =  {Op, . . . ,  Om}, a set of tokens, 7), is associated 
with each object such th a t each user is capable of generating exactly (m — 1) =  c 
tokens in T], for i = 1 , . . .  ,m .  Initially, th a t is prior to  any queries, the  token 
sets are identical: Tp =  Tg =  ... =  T .̂
3. Query processing
If token t e  Ti is used to  gain access to  Oi, then for every s ^  i, any token in 
Ts th a t was generated by the same key is deleted. Hence, the  token sets change 
as queries are made.
Two schemes, which differ in how the first stage is completed, are presented. 
Initialization of the database is essentially the same for both  and query processing is as
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described above. The first is a simple randomized scheme th a t achieves probabilistic 
guarantees on crowd control (that is, e >  0). The other is an algebraic scheme th a t 
offers deterministic guarantees on information access.
1. A  probabilistic key allocation schem e
To allocate keys to the users a bucket-based approach, which is often used in 
secure group communication (see, for example, [41]), is adopted. Let there be 
( r r i m a x  —  l ) / c  buckets, B i , . . . ,  B m ^ a x - i / c  each containing q  encryption keys 
(tha t is, there are q{mmax — l ) /c  keys in total). The keys themselves are ran ­
domly generated and are of one bit length suitable for the symmetric encryption 
scheme being used. For i = 1 , . . .  ,n , Ui receives a random ly selected key from 
each bucket for a to ta l of [rrimax — l) /c  keys per user.
Token sets for an inference channel of length m  < rrimax are formed by choosing 
a  subset of (m — 1)/c  buckets, , . . . ,  , and using the keys in each bucket
to  generate the tokens for each object in the m — channel. Hence, before any 
queries are made, each user has the ability to  query any objects, and so the 
scheme is c-collusion resistant. The following theorem  shows how, for a given 
value of e, the degree of crowd control afforded by the scheme depends on m 
and q .  The idea behind the theorem  is th a t a large set of users are likely to 
cover the key set of another user, so if these users have maximally queried the 
channel, the other user will be blocked.
Theorem  4.1.1 Let 0 < e <  1, and let c denote the collusion resistance o f an 
instance o f the probabilistic inference control scheme. Let x  =  "
then the scheme has [x,c,e)-crowd control.
PROOF. It suffices to show th a t if more th an  x  = — -  sets of c users
have queried m  — 1 objects, , . . . ,  , in an inference channel of length m
then the probability th a t a user U can query Qi^ is less than  e. U is unable 
to  query Qi^ if the key sets of the users who have queried any of the other 
objects in the channel cover the relevant part of U's key set (i.e. those keys 
of U's th a t are useful for querying this channel). Of course, this happens with 
probability l i i U  has made other queries, and otherwise, the probability
of this covering is at least (1 — (1 — c/g)^)^” “̂ ^Vcj_ Setting the la tte r quantity  to  
be a t least 1 — e and solving for x  gives the quantity in the theorem  statem ent.
This theorem shows th a t if a particular (m — l)-subset of the objects in a channel 
has been queried a lot, then users will be unable to  query the remaining object 
in the channel whether or not they have already made some queries. Its likely 
th a t most users will still be able to  access some ((m — l)/c)-subset of the queried 
objects, however, as the following lemma shows.
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Lem m a 4.1.2 Let 0 <  e < 1, and let c denote the collusion resistance o f an
instance of the probabilistic inference control scheme. I f  x  > — -
users have each maximally queried an m-channel, then with probability greater 
than 1 — e, 0 user U , who is not amongst the x users, can maximally query the 
same channel.
PRO O F. A user U  cannot maximally query the channel if two of U's  keys 
have been used to  query a single object. This is impossible if for every pair 
of U's keys, one of the  users who has maximally queried the channel has both 
such keys. The probability of this is a t least (note this is a coarse bound): 
(1 — (1 — llq^YY'"^BŸ _ The bound in the lemma can be obtained by setting this 
quantity  to  be greater than  1 — e.
Theorem  4.1.3 Let 0 < a < 1. Consider a c-collusion resistant instance of 
the probabilistic inference control scheme. I f  the number o f users who have 
maximally queried the channel is x  < s E  ̂ then with probability 
at least 1 — e, another user can access any subset of objects in the channel of
PRO O F. Consider a set of x +  1 users, U  ^  { U i , . . . , LQ}, the  expected number 
of U's  keys th a t U \ , . . . , U x  cover, is - We show th a t the probability th a t
U i , . . . , U x  cover more than  1 — a  of the keys U  has for querying the channel is 
less than  e. From [49], it follows th a t this is true when the following inequality
holds: ( < E- This inequality is satisfied by the bound on x
given in the statem ent of the theorem.
2. A variant w ith  determ inistic guarantees
The above key allocation scheme guarantees crowd control and information 
access probabilistically as a function of the number of users querying an infer­
ence channel. In some settings deterministic guarantees are necessary. We can 
achieve some deterministic guarantees by using error correcting codes to  allocate 
keys to  users. Specifically, we use Reed-Solomon codes (see, for example, [44]) 
to  allocate keys to  users. Reed-Solomon codes use a polynomial th a t is unique 
to  each user to  determine each users codeword, or in our case, key set. Because 
two polynomials of the same degree intersect on at most as many points as their 
degree, two users in our inference control scheme will share a t most as many 
keys as the degree of their polynomials. Using this fact, we construct a scheme 
with deterministic (i.e. e =  0) information access guarantees. The following 
makes the key allocation part of such a scheme more precise, the initialization 
of the database and the query processing are both  ju st as before.
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We consider all polynomials of degree t ,0  < t  < 1 )/ c, over the finite field
Fq of q elements, where rrimin is the minimum length of an inference channel. 
To each user, U, we associate a unique such polynomial, pU (x)  e  Fq[x]. For 
each element (y,/3) e  Fq x  Fq we generate a random  key, of the desired bit 
length. User U receives the set of keys K u  =  G A C Fq}, where A is
a set of size (nimax — l)/c. Note th a t this is very similar to  the bucket-based 
construction except th a t using polynomials to  allocate keys from the “buckets” 
gives more control over the overlap between users’ key sets. The following 
lemma dem onstrates one of the deterministic guarantees provided.
L e m m a  4 .1 .4  Consider a c-collusion resistant inference protection scheme that 
uses the key allocation method of this section. I f  x  < users have
maximally accessed an m-channel then another user can access any subset of 
objects in the channel o f size with probability 1.
PROOF. Consider a user U who is not among the x  users who have maximally 
accessed the  channel. U shares a t most t  keys with each of the x  users, and 
so a t most tx  < t{^F—LEkiSÙ.  ̂ — (m-iXi-a) to tal. Hence, U has more than
keys th a t none of the x  users have and can access a different object in 
the channel with each key.
An analysis very similar (but a bit more involved due to  the  fact th a t keys are 
not assigned independently) can be performed to  prove crowd control and lower 
bounds on information access. The scheme performs comparably to  the earlier 
one.
4 .1 .3  R em arks
Though proposing a creative idea to  handle the inference problem, this m ethod has 
some serious drawbacks. For example, it concentrates on a single inference channel 
for simplicity of exposition. W hen using our m ethods to  prevent inferences across 
multiple channels a potential problem arises when a single object appears in channels 
of different lengths. To ensure th a t no inferences can be made by exploiting the 
varying channel lengths it may be necessary to  reduce the num ber of acceptable keys 
associated with objects in overlapping channels, thus reducing information access. 
Also, it assumes a fixed user base. Over tim e, however, it is likely th a t users will 
lose access to  the database (i.e. be revoked) and new users will be added. To allow 
for the addition of new users we can choose q to  be larger than  is currently required. 
Of course, this will have consequences for crowd control; increasing q means users’ 
key sets are more disjoint and so the queries of individual users tend to  have less of 
an impact on the access capabilities of others. Thirdly, when a user is revoked from
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accessing the database their keys m ust no longer be valid. Simply deleting the tokens 
generated from their keys might unfairly restrict the access of others, so rekeying of 
the valid users may be needed.
The performance of this m ethod will be compared with another dynamic control 
presented in next section in a more detailed manner.
4.2 A ccessing K ey D istribution  Schem es
In [13], we design several accessing key distribution schemes to  solve the  inference 
problem in MLS databases. They are collusion resistant, efficient and easy to  imple­
ment. Unlike previous proposed schemes, they guarantee the maximum accessibility 
for users, a t the same tim e prevent inference problems and retain fast query process­
ing.
4.2.1 O verview
We assume th a t all inference channels are identified in an initial pre-query processing 
stage. Therefore, we can focus on inference control during the query processing. For 
the sake of simplicity, we consider only users a t the same security classification level 
in MLS database. The processing for users of other security levels is similar.
In our scheme, the foremost task  is to  generate an accessing key set, which is 
usually done by running a key generation algorithm at the system end. Each key 
contains information about the association to  objects. The number of keys in a key 
set depends on the length of the inference channels. We use K  to  denote a key set. 
Two kinds of key schemes are proposed in this paper. In one of them, the key set 
is only used by the database system so th a t users do not need to  keep any keys. In 
the other, each user has one secret key. In the initialization phase, all objects in an 
inference channel are associated with all or part of the keys in the key set. W hen a key 
is used to  access an object by a query algorithm, other queries have to  use the same 
key to access the object. This is done by deleting the association between the object 
and other keys. By doing so, our scheme ensures the  most fiexible access control 
(users are able to  decide which object they would like to  access provided th a t they 
can access all bu t one object in an inference channel), as well as fast query processing 
since the processing tim e depends on the  length of inference channels instead of users’ 
query histories. Besides, all keys are different and different keys cannot be used to 
access the same object. We will see how this feature provides the property of collusion 
resistance in later discussion.
We separate the schemes into two phases. The first is key initialization. In 
this phase, associations between keys and objects are established. The other is query 
processing which details the algorithm  of a query. The initial algorithm  runs one tim e
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(unless the whole system is going to  refresh). Then the query processing algorithm  
runs whenever a user wants to  access an object.
4.2 .2  S ingle K ey  S et Schem es
In this section, we present three key distribution schemes to  handle the inference 
control problem under three different settings.
1. A  Sim ple Scheme for Single Inference Channels
First we consider the case th a t  there is only one inference channel in the d a ta ­
base. Let m  denote the length of the  inference channel, and Oi, • • • ,0 m  the 
objects. Let U denote a user of database.
In our schemes, an object O  is associated with a set of keys denoted by K { 0 ) .  
In th is simple scheme, the to ta l number of keys is m  — 1: the set of keys 
K  = {ki, - ■ ■ and every object in the inference channel is associated
with all the m — 1 keys initially, i.e., K{O i) = K , i  — 1,2, - ■■ ,m .
The query processing is as follows. W hen a user tries to  access one object, a 
key is selected random ly by the algorithm. The association between the object 
and other keys will be deleted. A t the same time, the association between the 
selected key and other objects will be deleted as well. W hen all m  — 1 keys 
have been used, m  — 1  objects of m  objects in the channel are associated with 
keys. However, there is one object left, which is associated with no key a t all. 
We call th a t object “the reserved object” , which means no user can access it. 
Once a “reserved object” has been determined, the system puts an indicator 
on it. In this way, no user can access the reserved object. In other words, 
all users are able to  access all objects bu t the reserved object in the inference 
channel. Therefore, it is pointless for a  group of users to  try  to  do inference in 
collusion. Figure 4.2 is an small example. In this example, there are 4 objects 
0 \ , 0 2 , 0 3 , 0 4  in the channel. Initially, each object is associated with 3 different 
keys (see the upper part of the  picture). The lower part of the picture shows 
the key sets after one user requested O2. In this case, O2 is associate only with 
one key while other objects are associated with other 2 keys.
We now give the formal description of the scheme in the following algorithm. 
This algorithm consists of a key initialization algorithm and a query processing 
algorithm. Let K  denote a key set of m  — 1 keys.
A lgorithm  4.2.1 Single channel scheme for a user requesting object Oj.
Key i n i t i a l i z a t i o n :
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After 02 was requested by a 
Mauser: Keys are deleted_____
Figure 4.2: Example of inference control
K{O i) =  X, i =  1, • • •, m.
Query processing:
Input: i ]
if K{Oi) = 0 then
output “access denied” ;
else
Select random ly a kj E K{Oi)\
=  {kj};
K{Os) =  K {O s)\{k j}  for all s ^
Deliver Oi to  the user.
2. M ultiple Inference C hannels W ithout “R epeated O bject”
Now, let us consider the situation of more than  one inference channel in the 
database. The solution is to  allocate one set of keys to each inference channel. 
Let C  denote an inference channel, and I denote the number of inference channel 
in a database: C i, • • •, Q , the length of one inference channel Cj is denoted as 
rUj, j  =  1 , - ■ ■ , 1 , rrimax denote the maximum length of all inference channels. 
In this subsection, we only consider the situation th a t all channels are disjoint 
each other. In this case, the key set K  contains rrimax — 1 keys.
Query processing is similar to  the algorithm  for a single inference channel. The 
main difference is the initial sta te  of key sets. Initially, for channel Cj, let K j  be 
a set of rrij — 1 keys selected random ly from = Let K{Oi) =  Kj
if Oi G Cj.
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A lg o r ith m  4 .2 .2  Disjoint multiple channels scheme fo r a user requesting ob- 
jecf Oi-
Key i n i t i a l i z a t i o n :
K j  =  {ruj — 1 random  keys from K } , j  =  1, 2, • • • I; 
if  Os G Cj th e n  K{Os) = K j, for all possible s.
Query processing:
I n p u t :  i;
if  Find j  such th a t Oi G Cj th e n  { 
i f  K{Oi) =  0 th e n
output “access denied” and quit;
else
Select random ly a kp E K{Oi)]
=  {/cp};
K{Os) = K {O s)\{kp}  for all Os & Cj , s  ^  i]
Deliver O, to  the user;
}
else
output “information not found” .
3. M u lt ip le  In fe re n c e  C h a n n e ls  W ith  “R e p e a te d  O b je c t”
Finally, let us consider the situation th a t some objects appear in more than  
one inference channel. For illustration, we give another example in the same 
database as the example mentioned in section 1. The relationship between the 
project and its supporting company is classified. W hile users can access “tra in ­
ing course” on the  project, “person(engineer)” who attends the training course, 
and for which company the person(engineer) works. Thus, users can infer the 
company which supports the project. In this case, the inference channel has 
four objects: “project” , “training course” , “person(engineer)” and “company” . 
We name an object appearing in more than one channel after “repeated object” . 
Referring to  our examples, “project” and “company” are repeated objects.
There may exist two different cases during the query processing. One is th a t 
the repeated object is not a reserved object of any channel. In this case, users 
can access the repeated object in a way the same as what they do to access 
the other objects. The other case is th a t the repeated object, which users are 
trying to  access, is a reserved object, then the request should be denied.
We use the following algorithm. The initialization of the key sets is the same 
as th a t described in Algorithm 4.2.2. So the number of to ta l keys we used is 
mmax — 1- For a repeated object, the number of key sets associated with it is
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equal to  the  frequency of occurrence in all inference channels. We use Kj{O i) 
to  denote the key set which is associate w ith the object Oi in channel Cj.
A lg o r ith m  4 .2 .3  Multiple channels scheme fo r  a user requesting object Oi.
Key i n i t i a l i z a t i o n :
K j =  {nij — 1 random  keys from K } , j  =  1, • • •, Z; 
fo r All possible s do  {
if  Os G Cj th e n  Kj{Os) = K j J  =  1, • • ■, Z.
}
Query processing:
In p u t:  i;
i f  Oi G Cj th e n  {
if  K jiP i)  =  0 th e n
output “access denied” and quit; 
e lse  {
fo r every Cj such th a t  Oj G Cj d o  {
Select randomly a key kp G Kj{Oi)\
w h ile  Os G Cj and s i d o  {
R;(OJ = Rj(0,)\{A:p}
if  Kj{Os) =  0 th e n
Ks{Os) =  0 for all r  such th a t 0„ E Cr;
}
}




ou tpu t “ information not found” .
We would like to  mention the processing procedure of the repeated object in a 
more detailed way because it is special case. Let us assume th a t there exists 
an object which is a repeated object, and at the same tim e a reserved object 
of one inference channel. In order to  prevent users from receiving this object 
from other inference channels, we should synchronize the status of this object 
in all inference channels th a t it belongs to. The idea is th a t when a repeated 
object is accessed, the system should perform a function on the same object in 
other channels such th a t the status of the object is accessed. Similarly, once
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a repeated object is indicated as a reserved object, the system  should make it 
the  reserved object of all other channels in which it appears. In practice, we 
suggest th a t a number of system tables, which contain statistical data  about the 
inference channels, should be set up once all inference channels are identified.
4. P e r fo rm a n c e
Now we will give summary of the performance of our m ethod. To solve the 
inference problem, three key elements m ust be considered. They are listed as 
follows in the descending order of importance.
•  Security, which requires th a t  no user can do the undesirable inference, 
neither alone nor collaboratively.
•  Access flexibility, which means th a t maximum ability of access should be 
guaranteed provided th a t the possibility of performing an undesirable in­
ference is zero.
•  Response time, which means th a t in practice the query processing tim e 
meets the requirement of applications.
Under our key schemes, all users are able to  access the same m  — 1 objects in the 
inference channel. Therefore it is impossible for database users to  access objects 
enough to  perform an inference, neither alone nor in collusion. Moreover, we can 
see th a t our schemes actually promise the maximum access flexibility with the 
fact th a t m  -  1 out of m  objects are accessible. As to  the response time, because 
the number of keys depends only on the maximum length of inference channels 
in the database, the key space is so small th a t the response time is almost 
the same as the response tim e in a system without considering the inference 
problem.
As we mentioned in the previous section, [65] provides dynamic control over 
the inference problem. We now compare it with our scheme, meanwhile we will 
explain other benefits provided only by ours. For the sake of simplicity, we 
use “ S taddon’s Scheme ” to  denote the approach in [65] during the following 
discussion. Here we give a brief description of the scheme. In Staddon’s Scheme, 
a Probabilistic Key Allocation Scheme is used to  ensure dynamic control over the 
inference problem. Suppose there are m  objects Oi, O2, ■ ■ ■, Om in an inference 
channel and n users in the database. In the initialization phase, (m — l ) / c  
buckets of random  keys are set up, where c is the desired degree of collusion 
resistance. Each bucket contains q random  keys (so there are in total q{m — l ) / c  
keys used). Every user receives (m -  l ) / c  randomly selected keys such th a t  no 
keys are from a same bucket. In this phase, an object Oi in the channel is 
associated with a set of keys (In the original scheme, 7) is a set of tokens.
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2. Multiple channels 
no repeated objects
1. Single channel
2. M ultiple channels 
no repeated objects
3. M ultiple channels 
repeated objects
User base fixed variable
Table 4.1: Comparison of System Environment
Staddon’s Scheme Our Scheme
Cost 1. A list of acceptable key 
for each object
2. Each user has (m — l)/c  keys
3. Mechanism to prevent against 
key leaks
1. System tables
Parameters 1. Processing time: depending 
on m and q
2. Access flexibility: [1, (m — l)/c]
3. Key space: q{m — l)/c
4. Key size: large
5. Collusion resistance: < c
1. Processing time: depending 
on m
2. Access flexibility: m — 1
3. Key space: m — 1
4. Key size: small
5. Collusion resistance: Any size
Table 4.2: Comparison of Cost and Benefit
However, essentially, we can view the  set as a key set). Initially, R  contains all 
q{m — l ) / c  keys so th a t any key can be used to  access the object. During query 
processing, a key in R  m ust be used to  access an object Oi. If a key is used to 
access an object Oj, then  for every s 7  ̂ i, th a t key is deleted from Tj.
Firstly, we consider both two schemes’ performance in term s of system envi­
ronment (see Table 4.1). In our scheme, the  user base is variable since no user 
needs to  keep any keys. Table 4.2 shows the performance on system cost.
We can see th a t S taddon’s scheme has some drawbacks.
• In the Staddon’s Scheme, each user’s key set is different from the others, 
so the scheme has to  keep and m aintain a key set for every user, as well as 
provide prevention against key leaks.
• Since different keys are allowed to  be used to  access the same object, 
the scheme needs to  set up and m aintain a list of acceptable keys for each 
object. This feature also makes the number of accessible objects ( (m—l) /c)  
unwarranted. In fact, the num ber of accessible object is between 1 and 
(m — l)/c . For example, if there is a popular object in the channel th a t 
many users visit it (unfortunately, this is a common phenomenon), then
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many keys were deleted from the key sets of other objects. In this way, 
many other objects are unavailable for users.
• W hen the inference channel is short (m is small), the system only can let 
c =  1. T ha t means the scheme cannot protect against a collusion of users 
to attack in this case.
We should point out th a t in our schemes, none of these problems exists. Our 
schemes can protect against any size of collusion while S taddon’s scheme only 
can bear c users’ collusion. Note th a t in their scheme, there is a trade-off 
between the value of c and the accessibility of a user so th a t c cannot be large. 
Moreover, since the keys are used only by the database system, we can use any 
set of size rrimax — 1 as the key set. Therefore the size of a key can be very small. 
For example, we may use the set {1,2, - • - , m  — 1} as the key set. However, the 
size of a key in S taddon’s scheme should be large enough to  prevent from key 
leaking.
Another useful feature of our schemes is the scalability. Suppose an inference 
channel was identified and a key scheme is set. However, the  system finds later 
th a t some objects should be added or deleted from the channel. In th is case, 
we just need add or reduce some keys from the scheme.
Our scheme is also easy to  refresh because users do not possess keys. A system 
can run the key initialization algorithm in any time.
In practice, we can use system tables to  store statistical d a ta  on inference chan­
nels, such as the number of inference channel within the database, w hat objects 
are contained in an inference channel, etc. The data  is im portant when system  
functions are performed, for instance, when a function is run to  change the 
status of a repeated object. However, they are statistical data, so they would 
not occupy much system resources.
4 .2 .3  M ultip le  K ey Set Schem es
Schemes in Section 4.2.2 are very simple and efficient. The main drawback of them  is 
th a t a user can perform “block an object” attack as follows. The user just visits all the 
m — 1 other objects in the inference channel so th a t the last object is blocked. This 
problem will be more serious if the channel is “short” (the num ber of the objects 
is small). In practice, the system may establish a time frame. W ithin this tim e 
frame, any coalition of users cannot get the all information in the  inference channel. 
However, after the tim e frame, the key set is refreshed and the channel returns to 
its initial stage. Another m ethod to  prevent the attack is the requirement of extra 
authorization. W hen a user is requesting the reserved object, the  system reassesses 
and decides whether to  grant extra authorization to the user.
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In this section, we propose another scheme which prevents the attack w ith the 
price th a t more keys are used. For simplicity, we only describe a scheme for a single 
inference channel. However, it is straightforward to modify this scheme to the other 
cases discussed in Section 4.2.2.
Recall th a t in a single inference channel, there are m  objects. In the previous 
scheme, the system associates m — 1 keys to each object. In this scheme we associate 
qt keys to  each object in the channel (we will discuss later th a t t = (m — l ) /c ,  where 
c >  1 related to  the size of collusion). The keys are divided into q disjoint subsets 
each containing t  keys. The main idea is th a t when a user queries an object, only 
one of the subsets is involved in the processing so th a t other users can still access 
any object with high probability even if a user performed “block an object” attack. 
In order for the system to recognize users, each user needs a key in this scheme. For 
users w ith the same secret key, the algorithm is just like Algorithm 4.2.1. However, 
there are q “copies” of the key set and users with different keys will involve different 
copies. We describe the scheme in the following subsection.
1. T h e  schem e
To initialize the scheme, the system chooses two random  key sets Q and T, 
where |Q| =  q and \T\ = t. In the initialization phase, each object is associated 
w ith the key set K  = Q x  T . In other words, each object is associated with 
q copies of set T. For a user U, the system assigns a random  key qu E Q to  
h im /her. W hen the user U wants to  access an object Oj, the  key qu m ust be 
subm itted. We use the following algorithm to describe the scheme.
A lg o r ith m  4 .2 .4  Multiple key set scheme fo r  the user U requesting object O,.
Key i n i t i a l i z a t i o n :
Ki = {%} X r ,  for all £ Q, j  =  1 , ■ • •, m;
K{Oj)  = Uq.gQA/,/ =  1, • • • ,m .
Query processing:
Input: i , q u ]  
if  =  0 then
output “access denied” ;
else
Select random ly a kj E 
^qu  ^  {^i}i
Deliver Oi to  the user.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
C H APTE R 4. REM O V AL OF IN FERENCES 70
Scheme [65] Our Scheme
Key space -  l) /c g(m -  l) /c
User key (m -  l ) / c 1
Query time l) /c q + { m -  l) /c
Access flexibility [ l , ( m -  l)/c] (m -  l ) / c
Suitability 1 and 2 1, 2 and 3
Collusion resistance c A t least c
Table 4.3; Comparison w ith multiple key set scheme
In this scheme, each user can access a t most t objects of the channel. A coalition 
of c users, where ct < m  — I, cannot obtain the information of all the objects 
in the channel. Since each qu is random ly selected from the key set Q, the 
probability th a t a user get a specific key is i .  In order to block an object for 
a user U, there should be a coalition of c users who hold the same key qu- 
Therefore the probability th a t a coalition of c users can perform the  “block an 
object” attack to  a user is There is obviously a trade-off between c and t. 
Here c is the size of a collusion the scheme can tolerate and t is a  measure of 
the accessibility for a  user.
2. P e rfo rm a n c e
Now we compare our multiple key set scheme to  the scheme of [65]. For conve­
nience, we let both schemes use a key space of size q{m  — l) /c . Table 4.3 lists 
general param eters of these two schemes.
In our scheme, each user only keeps one secret key while a  user needs to  keep 
(m — l ) / c  keys in the other scheme. During the query processing, our scheme 
first finds a f-subset using qu and then trea ts the t-set. So the tim e requirem ent 
is q + t = q + {m — l ) / c  in this case. S taddon’s scheme needs to  trea t all the 
q{m  — l ) / c  keys. Therefore our scheme is more efficient in both space and tim e 
complexity.
Moreover, we can see th a t our scheme does not have the main weaknesses in­
dicated in last section. In our scheme, each user only has to  keep one key and 
each user can always visit (m — l ) / c  objects even if one object was visited by 
all of the users. In our scheme, a coalition o f c + 1  users may not be able to  do 
the inference, because some users may have the same key. Suppose there are b 
users. Then the probability tha t c + \  users can get all the information in the 
inference channel is
C D
4'+' ' ( c  +  l)!'
<
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This shows th a t even in the  case of c =  1 (when inference channel is short), our 
scheme still provides a little collusion resistance while S taddon’s scheme cannot.
We should indicate th a t although we pu t the key spaces as q{m — l ) / c  in both  
schemes, the  key space of our scheme is much smaller. Note th a t in S taddon’s 
scheme, all the q{m  — l ) / c  keys should be randomly selected from a large set 
(much larger than  q{m — l ) /c ) .  Otherwise, a user can perform a simple a ttack  
by randomly selecting several keys and using these keys to  query the objects in 
the inference channel. In our scheme, only q secret keys are used. So we ju st 
randomly select q keys from a large set (much larger than q). The set of T  can 
be any t-set, e.g., T  =  {1 ,2, • • •, t} , because set T  is used and maintained by the 
system. Therefore the size of key in T  can be very small. In practice, we can 
use {qu;l,2 , - ■ ■ ,t)  to record a initial key subset and delete integers accordingly 
during the query processing.
4 .2 .4  R em arks
In this section, we proposed several key schemes to  handle inference problems in a 
multilevel database. All these schemes are simple and very efficient while providing 
collusion resistance to  information inference. Different situations are considered in 
th is paper including th a t several inference channels were identified in a database, 
which are not disjoint.
Our scheme is very easy to  implement if all the inference channels are identified. 
We note th a t so far there is no efficient m ethod to  identify all the inference channels 
in a  database [36][29] [70], which lim its the application of our schemes. In fact, many 
inference problem is a probabilistic problem in nature. It means th a t the probability 
of a correct inference depends on the information obtained. In this case, no ideal 
inference channel can be identified. One open question for our schemes is whether 
these schemes can be modified by adding some probabilistic weighting to handle this 
situation.
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C onclusion and Future R esearch
This thesis provides a comprehensive view of the inference problem, and some rep­
resentative techniques on detecting and removing the problem in MLS databases are 
discussed as well. Furthermore, the findings of our research are shown. There are 
two paper from this thesis: “A Scheme for Inference Problems Using Rough Sets and 
Entropy” and “A Dynamic M ethod for Handling the Inference Problem  in Multilevel 
Secure Databases” , which are represented in Section 3.5 and 4.2 respectively.
In section 3.5, we proposed an integrated, com putational solution for the inference 
problem. The solution contains two main parts. F irst we use rough sets to  deduce the 
minimal set of decision rules from dataset. Then we use information rates to  measure 
the amount of information contained in the dataset. By quantifying bo th  security 
and functionality, we are able to  analyze the possible changes in them . Depending 
on these analysis, we suggest a practical way to  decide the set of values to  be hidden 
which solves the inference problem.
Our scheme to handle the inference problem is the first one to  propose com puta­
tionally feasible methods for bo th  security and functionality of a dataset. Although 
some other techniques, such as decision trees and Bayesian networks, were used to  
form decision rules, we feel th a t rough sets have some advantages in reasoning about 
data. For example, rough sets use decision tables to represent data  when forming de­
cision rules. Tabular form of representation allows us for easy com putation of tru th  
of decision rules, and consequently provides an easy way to  simplify the  rules. A 
disadvantage is tha t inconsistent records are abandoned when deducing decision rules 
in the beginning. This may cause some useful da ta  to  be excluded because of a small 
number of noisy data. One possible solution for th a t  is to  give some weight to  the 
rules according to  the number of same records.
In section 4.2, we proposed a set of key distribution schemes to  apply dynamic 
control over the inference problem. Some of these schemes use one small key set used 
by the database system, thus the database provides the maximum flexible accessibility. 
Some of them  use multiple key sets, thus blocking one object attacks (blocking one
72
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object attack means th a t one object in an inference channel cannot be accessed by 
any user after other objects have been queried by users), can be prevented. Although 
this is decided by the nature of the inference control problem, we have p u t much 
effort into seeking solutions for it.
One im portant factor for a inference control scheme is the efficiency of the scheme. 
For the efficiency, we mainly considered two things. One is the availability of the 
information and the other is query processing time. It does not make much sense to  
us th a t a system extremely limits the users’ accessibility to  protect against inference 
attacks. Our scheme allows a user to access as much information as possible. Since 
we use keys to  control the system, the num ber of keys and the size of a key determine 
the query processing time. Therefore we tried to  reduce the key space used in the 
schemes. One of the ideas is to  keep as many as possible the keys in database system. 
In this way, keys w ith small size can be used because there is no key leaking problems.
For future research, as the technology of database management system develops, 
and the security of real applications increases, techniques handling the inference prob­
lem should be improved to adopt to  the  new feathers. In addition, we also feel th a t 
the inference problem occuring in d a ta  mining and web-based inference would be 
interesting topics.
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